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Trade and climate change are at a crossroads. For the world
to meet the long-term temperature goals under the Paris Agreement, all nations must actively engage with greening their economies and energy supplies. The fastest way to achieve this is to
allow, or even encourage, green industrial policies which incentivize the manufacture and diffusion of renewable energy. These
policies often include elements such as renewable portfolio standards, requirements for mixing biofuels with gasoline, as well as
local content requirements. These types of policies are particularly important and relevant for developing countries as they aim
to reduce poverty, improve economic development, and mitigate
the adverse effects of climate change.
Where these policies include protectionist measures such as
local content requirements, they violate basic World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and principles of non-discrimination.
Emerging economies in the developing world have been on the
losing end of most of the recent energy disputes at the WTO, but
are an increasingly large site of greenhouse gas emissions globally. Given the existing friction between the trade and climate
change regimes, countries are likely to engage in strategic compliance in order to preserve their domestic policy aims, at least in
the short term.
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One of the challenges facing policy makers in emerging economies at the intersection of climate and trade is how to dramatically increase the manufacture, dissemination, and export of renewable energy technology through green industrial policy
making without violating trade rules. This article proposes a twostep jurisprudential advance to this problem. First, it highlights
a broader range of defenses under Article XX available to emerging economies connected with the climate crisis. Second, it offers
a set of general principles that the WTO’s own dispute settlement
mechanism could introduce in the context of climate change.
These solutions ultimately have broader import than just to developing countries (the locus of the case studies), as developed
countries engage in their own industry policy battles and consider implementing green new deals.
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INTRODUCTION

Trade conflicts burgeoned under the Trump Administration,
particularly with China. President Trump imposed tariffs on a
number of imports, including solar cells, and engaged in trade
conflicts with both allies and rivals of the United States in an
attempt to revive ailing domestic manufacturing industries.1 At
the same time, US states are implementing their own policies to
incentivize the transition to renewable energy. Imagine a state
allowed its power company to pay its customers for electricity
those customers produced using renewable energy. The state
then provided the power company credits against its public utility commission taxes equal to the amounts it paid customers for
renewable energy. Those customers could obtain additional incentive payments if they used solar inverters, solar modules,
Stirling converters, or wind blades manufactured in that state
to produce their renewable energy. Or imagine that a state provided a tax incentive for production of ethanol to be blended in
gasoline, and required a minimum percentage of that ethanol to
be produced from products originating from that state. Both of
these programs incentivize the manufacture and diffusion of renewable energy, and assist the United States in tackling the
problem of climate change. In fact, these are programs from
Washington (the Renewable Energy Cost Recovery Incentives
Payment Program) and Montana (Tax Incentive for Ethanol

1. TIMOTHY MEYER & GANESH SITARAMAN, A BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW
AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 8 (2018).

4

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 22:1

Production), which were both held to violate trade rules in June
2019.2
This example demonstrates that the World Trade Organization (WTO)3 and the new climate regime under the Paris Agreement4 have conflicting aims. The WTO focuses on free trade,
non-discrimination, and disciplining domestic protectionism,
with limited policy exceptions provided to countries under Article XX of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).5
Article XX provides countries with several exceptions to allow
discriminatory treatment which would otherwise violate WTO
rules, including on the basis of environmental reasons (Article
XX(g)) or health reasons (Article XX(b)).6 Under the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO, parties have engaged in selective enforcement by only bringing suits against renewable energy domestic policies and not against fossil fuel subsidies.7 This
selective enforcement imposes additional costs on renewable energy’s “ability to compete in the marketplace[,] and may slow the
investment in [necessary] innovation,” and “subsidizes products
with large social costs” such as fossil fuels.8
The Paris Agreement aims to incentivize ambitious action
by all countries at the national level to keep long-term temperature increases well below 2° C above pre-industrial levels (with
an aspirational goal of 1.5° C) in order to avoid catastrophic climate change.9 Countries contribute to these collective goals
2. Panel Report, United States–Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS510/R (adopted June 27, 2019). The United
States has appealed the decision. Joe Biden’s “Build Back Better Plan” focuses
on manufacturing clean energy components domestically, illustrating that protectionist approaches to trade and renewable energy are not entirely partisan
issues. The Biden Plan to Build a Modern, Sustainable Infrastructure and an
Equitable Clean Energy Future, https://joebiden.com/clean-energy (last visited
Jan. 13, 2021) [hereinafter Biden Energy Plan].
3. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/ (last visited Sept.
30, 2020).
4. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter GATT 1994]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter WTO Agreement Annex 1A].
6. GATT 1994, supra note 5.
7. Timothy Meyer, Free Trade, Fair Trade and Selective Enforcement, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 491, 494–95 (2018) [hereinafter Meyer, Free Trade].
8. Id. at 497–98.
9. Paris Agreement, supra note 4, art. 2(a).
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through the submission of nationally determined contributions,
which are supposed to reflect decreasing greenhouse gas emissions over time.10 The trade and climate change regimes exist
within silos, but the systemic nature of climate change forces a
reconsideration of the nexus between trade and climate change.
Climate action at the national level is often implemented by developed and developing countries through green industrial policy making around energy,11 which as illustrated above, often involves both environmental and economic and developmental
objectives. Many of these policies have been on the losing end of
disputes at the WTO, but arguably should be allowed under Article XX exceptions. These energy disputes demonstrate global
wrangling to achieve economic dominance in clean energy industries. All of these disputes fall against a backdrop where liberalizing trade in clean energy is grounded in comparative advantage theory: removing barriers to international trade in
theory would allow the most efficient, competitive producers of
clean energy to prevail.12
The first (albeit tentative) phase of the bilateral trade agreement between the United States and China signals a further decline in multilateral trade relationships under the WTO.13
10. Id. art. 3.
11. See, e.g., Brazil–Country Profile, GREEN FISCAL POL. NETWORK (Mar.
30, 2017), https://greenfiscalpolicy.org/policy_briefs/brazil-country-profile-2/
(“Several national policies aimed at greening Brazil’s power sector have been
launched, such as the Alternative Energy Source Incentive Program (PROINFA), the National Energy Conservation Program (PROCEL), the National
Program for the Rational Use of Oil and Natural Gas, the National Biodiesel
Production, and Usage Program (PNBP).”).
12. Christopher M. Dent, Clean Energy Trade Governance: Reconciling
Trade Liberalism and Climate Interventionism?, 23 NEW POL. ECON. 728, 730
(2017).
13. Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China,
Jan. 15, 2020, U.N.T.S. forthcoming; Don Lee & Alice Su, US and China Agree
to Partial Trade Deal, but Few Details Are Released, L.A.TIMES (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-12-13/u-s-and-china-agree-topartial-trade-deal-but-few-details-are-released; Ryan Woo & Jeff Mason,
China, US Sign Initial Trade Pact but Doubts and Tariffs Linger, REUTERS
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china/china-u-ssign-initial-trade-pact-but-doubts-and-tariffs-linger-idUSKBN1ZE0I1; cf. Susanne Droege, Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das & Michael Mehling, The Trade
System and Climate Action: Ways Forward Under the Paris Agreement CLIMATE
STRATEGIES 4, 30 (Climate Strategies, Working Paper, Oct. 2016) (noting that
“regional trade agreements are a promising way forward for introducing and
testing new rules on climate and trade”); Kathleen Claussen, Dispute
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Bilateral, regional and mega-regional trade arrangements have
over the years led to the declining influence of the WTO. This
decline, combined with the blocking by the United States of the
appointment of appellate judges in the Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DSM),14 mean that the ability (and relevance) of the
DSM to adjudicate multilateral trade disputes is now questionable.15 These developments may lead developing (and developed)
countries to engage in or continue existing strategic compliance
(delaying compliance until trade remedies are imminent). The
trade remedies phase at the WTO can take a long time to complete, and so the system provides ample opportunities for countries to engage in strategic compliance. This provides countries
with economic and policy space to pursue goals they consider to
be the most beneficial to them nationally. This strategic compliance approach is often motivated by a convenient compliance approach (complying only when it is convenient and benefits existing domestic policies). Finally, countries may simply ignore the
outcome of disputes and never comply, and instead employ more
domestic protectionist measures to implement and entrench domestic green industrial policy making.
While these approaches could have some climate benefits
where countries’ green industrial policies have demonstrable climate impacts, they also undermine the multilateral system of
trade. This could lead to escalating trade conflicts and a de-emphasis on multilateral trade rules, which could spill over to
Settlement Under the Next Generation of Free Trade Agreements, 46 GA. J. INTL.
& COMP. L. 661, 615 (2018) (noting that “[r]egional and bilateral agreements
have eclipsed the WTO in importance”). The first phase of the agreement contains a bilateral dispute settlement mechanism designed to avoid disputes being submitted to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
14. Jens Lehne, Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking of Appeals to the WTO
Appellate Body by the United States Legally Justified?, in 6 SUI GENERIS 3 (Daniel Hürlimann & Marc Thommen eds., 2019) (asserting that US arguments of
judicial overreach and disregard of the WTO rules by Appellate Body judges
used to block appointments to the Appellate Body since mid-2017 are not legally
justifiable). As of December 2019, the number of Appellate Body judges dropped
to one, below the three required for a quorum. Id. at 133–34; see also Press Release, World Trade Organization, Members Reiterate Joint Call to Launch Selection Process for Appellate Body Members (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dsb_22nov19_e.htm.
15. A number of countries have agreed to an ad-hoc workaround to the current stasis. See Beatriz Rios, China, WTO Members Join EU’s Ad-Hoc Appellate
Body in Davos, EURACTIV (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/
economy-jobs/news/china-wto-members-join-eus-ad-hoc-appellate-body-in-davos/.
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political conflicts; failure to align the WTO and UNFCCC regimes could also undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of
both the trade and climate regimes. Conversely, efforts within
the trade regime to “promote sustainability as well as eliminate
poverty, reduce income inequality, protect workers, and advance
public health might well help to rebuild confidence in trade as a
pathway to a better future.”16
Developing countries hold more than half of the world’s renewable energy capacity,17 and they are anticipated to bear the
brunt of the impacts of climate change.18 Given that the outcomes of most of the DSM disputes on energy have been negative
for developing and developed countries so far, in the short term
strategic compliance may not be so detrimental for the climate if
countries implement urgent and progressive renewable energy
policies. In the longer term, if the WTO and its DSM is reinvigorated, a more synergistic relationship between trade and climate change is needed in order to reduce the existing friction
between these two regimes. Part of a revised relationship between trade and climate change could be achieved jurisprudentially through the DSM. The existing dispute mechanism has the
flexibility to accommodate emerging global issues and cater its
jurisprudence accordingly, within the limits of the language of
the WTO agreements. In fact, Article XX has previously been

16. Daniel C. Esty & Susan Biniaz, Introduction to COOL HEADS IN A WARMING WORLD: HOW TRADE POLICY CAN HELP FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE vii, (Daniel

Esty & Susan Biniaz eds., Yale Ctr. Envtl. L. & Pol., 2019), https://envirocenter.yale.edu/cool-heads-warming-world-how-trade-policy-can-help-fight-climate-change.
17. See RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 4 (2010), https://www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/
activities/gsr/REN21_GSR_2010_full_revised%20Sept2010.pdf (discussing governmental utilization of renewables); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 9 (2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/renewable-energy-sources-and-climate-change-mitigation/ (“Collectively,
developing countries host 53% of global [renewable energy] electricity generation capacity.”).
18. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 15–16 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf; Ilona M. Otto et al., Social Vulnerability to Climate Change: A Review of Concepts and Evidence, 17 REG’L ENV’T
CHANGE 1651, 1658 (2017) (discussing the effects of climate change on vulnerable communities); David J. Wrathall et al., Problematising Loss and Damage,
8 INT’L J. GLOB. WARMING 274, 282–85 (2015) (discussing monetary compensation difficulties in traditional and indigenous societies).
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subject to progressive interpretation by the DSM,19 and there is
no reason why this approach cannot be adopted in disputes involving renewable energy. This paper suggests a two-step jurisprudential approach that could be adopted by both developing
countries and the DSM.
It is at the nexus of climate change and trade that this paper
focuses on emerging economies in the developing world through
the lens of energy disputes at the WTO. The actions of these
countries in the context of both climate change and energy are
critical to global energy transitions and climate stabilization efforts anticipated by the Paris Agreement. Emerging economies
such as BASIC countries20 are introducing public stimulus programs and making investments in infrastructure, rural development, and urban planning in order to achieve green growth.
While increased incorporation of renewables into domestic electricity grids is an important part of the energy transition, this
paper focuses on manufacture, implementation, and diffusion of
green technology, which also faces many hurdles.21

19. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO Rules and Environmental Policies:
GATT Exceptions, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm (noting that Article XX has been interpreted to allow “measures
that are inconsistent with GATT disciplines,” such as “policies aimed at reducing the consumption of cigarettes, protecting dolphins, reducing risks to human
health posed by asbestos, [and] reducing risks to human, animal and plant life
and health arising from the accumulation of waste tyres [sic]”) (last visited Oct.
12, 2020).
20. BASIC countries are four newly industrialized countries which still
self-identify as developing countries under most international treaties: Brazil,
South Africa, India and China. Defining the groupings of non-industrialized
countries in the world has been subject to much debate. The terms “Third
World,” “developing world,” and “Global South” originated in different periods
and have been contested in terms of their appropriateness and accuracy. Today,
the terms “Global South” and “Global North” have become the favored option by
scholars and policy makers, based on an earlier “North-South” distinction of the
1980s with the prefix “global” clarifying that this is not a purely geographical
categorization of the world, but one based on economic inequalities. See SYLVIA
CHANT & CATHY MCILWAINE, GEOGRAPHIES OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBAL SOUTH 6, 11 (2009) (discussing the
different methods of classifying areas of the world). This paper will continue to
use the terms “developed” and “developing countries” as these terms are identified and used in the WTO system.
21. Electricity markets are predominantly local, crossing borders between
countries where significant grid infrastructure exists or could be built and so
are subject to physical restraints, but renewable energy technology is a more
global market and traded across borders and so is more vulnerable to WTO
trade disciplines. Ilaria Espa & Gracia Marín Durán, Renewable Energy
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Environmental externalities are not well reflected in markets,
there is inadequate information on products, and behavioral barriers persist.22 In addition, continuous reinvestment in nongreen infrastructure can lead to path dependency on fossil fuels
and challenges regarding sources of finance.23 Lock-in of fossil
fuel technology and infrastructure as well as market failures are
difficult to surmount.24
This paper takes a novel approach by examining the strategies of emerging economies at the WTO across a set of disputes
which fall into two main categories: renewable energy and biofuels. Very few academics have explored these renewable energy
disputes through the lens of climate change, and even fewer from
the perspective of developing countries. The record of success of
developing countries in these disputes is mixed, although largely
unsuccessful both in law and “in fact” (in terms of trade remedies). This paper will suggest some understandings of why this
may be the case, based on inherent inadequacies of the trade
system to accommodate climate objectives, and how these inadequacies could be overcome.
While this paper focuses on emerging economies, the analysis has relevance for developed economies as well, as they consider their own form of domestic protectionism, green industrial
policy making, and green new deals (for example, see Joe Biden’s
“Build Back Better” platform).25 The nature of energy disputes
has shifted over time. Energy policies of developed countries are
also becoming subject to the DSM. India recently won a panel
decision regarding renewable energy regulations in California,
Minnesota, Texas, Montana, Michigan, Washington, and

Subsidies and WTO Law: Time to Rethink the Case for Reform and Beyond Canada–Renewable Energy/Fit Program, 21 J. Int’l Econ. L. 625–26 (2018).
22. Rene Kemp & Babette Never, Green Transition, Industrial Policy, and
Economic Development, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 66, 66 (2017) (discussing
challenges of developing and implementing green technologies in both industrialized and developing nations).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 67.
25. See, e.g., Biden Energy Plan, supra note 2; Recognizing the Duty of the
Federal Government to Create a Green New Deal, H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong.
(2019) (calling for the creation of a Green New Deal); Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Green Deal, COM (2019) 640 final (Dec. 11, 2019) (calling
for and proposing a European Green Deal).
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Delaware found to be in violation of WTO rules.26 Given the
largely negative outcomes of these disputes for renewable energy
and in particular the problem of discriminatory local content requirements, a “pause” in these disputes due to the decline of the
DSM may be beneficial for the climate, providing policy space to
countries to use local content requirements and other protectionist policies to ramp up climate action and green energy development. Domestic protectionist policies, including subsidies, if well
designed, could (and already have)27 decrease costs and increase
the production and diffusion of renewable energy both domestically and around the world, including in other developing countries. Assuming the WTO and the DSM continue to operate in
the longer term, energy disputes are only likely to increase and
so a more synergistic relationship between the WTO and the
Paris Agreement will be needed. Countries can (and do) unilaterally impose countervailing and other duties which increase the
cost of imports of renewable energy and hamper its diffusion,
and so a more comprehensive approach to energy and climate
concerns at the WTO will be needed if we are to meet the goals
of the Paris Agreement.28

26. United States—Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy
Sector, supra note 2. Meyer argues that it is in fact developed countries that are
“clamoring for policy space” in the trading system as they are unable to provide
direct subsidies via a centralized, state-based banking system as China can. See
Timothy Meyer, The Law and Politics of Socially Inclusive Trade, 2019 U. ILL.
L. REV. 33, 42 (2019) (discussing the negative impact on trade institutions from
developed countries failure to deal with economic inequalities).
27. INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, A NEW WORLD: THE
GEOPOLITICS OF THE ENERGY TRANSFORMATION (2019) (summarizing efforts
and changes in energy transformation and noting a steep decline in the cost of
renewable energy); REN21, RENEWABLES 2019 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT (2019)
(summarizing renewable energy efforts and data from around the world).
28. Brian Eckhouse, Ari Natter & Chris Martin, Trump’s Tariffs on Solar
Mark Biggest Blow to Renewables Yet, BLOOMBERG: CLIMATE CHANGED (Jan.
23, 2018, 3:38 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-22/
trump-taxes-solar-imports-in-biggest-blow-to-clean-energy-yet (discussing tariffs imposed on solar products); Graeme Wearden, China Fuels Trade War Fears
With New Tariffs on US Goods—As it Happened, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2018/apr/04/china-us-trade-wartariffs-wpp-markets-eurozone-jobs-business-live (summarizing the timeline of
events China took in response to US tariffs signalling a potential trade war
between the US and China); Doug Palmer, Trump’s Global Trade War, POLITICO (May 31, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-duties-steelaluminum-global-trade-war (discussing the negative impacts to US manufacturers and consumers, and ally relationships, newly imposed tariffs have).
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While legislative reform at the WTO has been suggested and
would certainly be a more comprehensive approach, this paper
suggests a partial solution through a twofold jurisprudential approach, assuming the appellate function of the DSM is revived.
In the first instance, existing disputes can provide lessons to developing countries on how to better cater and craft their domestic policies to more easily align with existing defenses available
under Article XX in the context of the climate crisis. At the same
time, Article XX should be reinterpreted by panels, and the Appellate Body, to allow more policy space for countries to implement and diffuse green energy technology (even with local content requirements), and so reduce the friction between the WTO
and the Paris Agreement.
This paper is structured as follows: in section one, a brief
overview of the WTO, DSM, and Article XX is provided as background for the analysis of the renewable energy disputes covered
in the paper. In section two, the relationship between energy,
trade, and climate change is expanded upon, paving the way, in
section three, for a historical background of the relationship between energy and the WTO and green industrial policy making.
This background provides context for why the legislative gap in
terms of energy exists at the WTO, and explains why disputes
around renewable energy have arisen through the DSM. As the
need for energy transitions towards renewables becomes more
urgent in the context of the climate crisis, the inability of the
WTO to cater for these renewable energy disputes through the
lens of climate change becomes a pressing issue. The traditional
trade approach to renewables may impede their development
and lead to more strategic or convenient compliance by states.
Section four will analyze the strategies used by India and China
in renewable energy disputes, and Argentina and Indonesia in
biofuels disputes. These countries’ approach to green industrial
policy making and climate change are critically important if the
world is to meet the global temperature goals in the Paris Agreement, and the domestic policies of these countries have been disputed at the WTO. India included local content requirements for
solar panels as part of its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission,29 and China provided subsidies to state owned enterprises
29. Dispute Settlement, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells
and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. D.S.456, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e
/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2020) (discussing India’s content requirements for solar panels and subsequent WTO action).
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manufacturing wind towers and solar panels.30 Argentina and
Indonesia imposed export duties on locally produced raw materials used to manufacture biofuels in order to make their domestically produced biofuels cheaper on the international markets.31
The paper will conclude with a focus specifically on how existing
defenses under Article XX are being relied upon in these disputes, and evaluate the circumstances under which these countries could tighten their domestic policies in the context of the
climate emergency to more closely align with Article XX defenses
such as XX(b) and (g).32 It will also advocate for a more climatefriendly interpretation of Article XX by the DSM.
I.

THE WTO, DSM, AND ARTICLE XX

The WTO was formally established as an institution in
1995,33 although its historical roots go back much further in

30. Chen Gang, China’s Solar PV Manufacturing and Subsidies from the
Perspective of State Capitalism, 33 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUDIES 90, 97–100
(2015) (discussing China’s subsidies of wind and solar manufacturers to spur
increased production).
31. See generally Philip Blenkinsop & Gabriel Burin, Argentina Says
Clinches Deal to Resume Biodiesel Exports to EU, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2019,
9:48AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-biodiesel-argentina/argentinasays-clinches-deal-to-resume-biodiesel-exports-to-eu-idUSKCN1PO25B
(discussing the implications of and subsequent actions relating to Argentine export
duties on biodiesel); Philip Blenkinsop, EU Hits Indonesian Biodiesel With Import Duties Over Subsidies, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2019, 8:16AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-indonesia-biodiesel/eu-hits-indonesian-biodiesel-withimport-duties-over-subsidies-idUSKBN1YD1HG (discussing subsequent EU
action in response to Indonesian subsidies).
32. GATT 1994, supra note 5, at para. B (discussing the “necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health” defense); and para. G (discussing
the “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” defense).
33. The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/history_e/history_e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
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time.34 The agreement establishing the WTO35 includes, in its
annexes, a number of agreements referred to as “covered agreements,” although they are not stand-alone agreements.36 Countries accede to the WTO as a single-package deal, agreeing to all
of the multilateral covered agreements. These include agreements on the trade in goods, including the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT 1994), the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures agreement (SCM), Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS).37 The
member states of the WTO must adhere to the provisions of all
of these multilateral covered agreements.
The institutional architecture of the WTO includes a robust
DSM. Despite the declining influence of the WTO in recent
years, the DSM is still critical to its operation. The DSM provides
binding interpretive approaches of the main ‘covered agreements’ of the WTO. Some major subject areas of these agreements, which are relevant to this paper, include agreements on
subsidies, agriculture, investment, and trade in goods and services. The DSM applies to all of these agreements. The interpretations the DSM provides are integral to the operation of the
WTO and parties’ compliance with it.
There are a number of possible exceptions to the provisions
of WTO covered agreements, including waivers agreed on by the
parties under GATT Article XXV,38 exceptions for developing
countries in Article XVIII,39 and most importantly for this paper,

34. The precursor to the WTO was the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs in 1947. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. However, the principles of multilateral
trade relationships were established as a result of bilateral friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties between independent nations in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, resulting in the 1890 treaty Concerning the Creation
of an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs. See JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 35 (2d ed. 1997). The provisions of
GATT 1947 evolved from US bilateral trade agreements. Id. at 37. Claussen
notes that trade provisions adapt and evolve from other trading agreements and
in the labor and environmental fields can achieve normative convergence.
Claussen, supra note 13 at 615.
35. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
36. JACKSON, supra note 34, at 46–47.
37. See WTO Agreement Annex 1A, supra note 5.
38. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XXV.
39. Id. art. XVIII.

14

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 22:1

general exceptions included under Article XX of the GATT
1994.40 As there is no international environmental court, how
the DSM interprets these exceptions, particularly exceptions related to public health and the environment, is critically important to how states will implement provisions and commitments under international environmental treaties,41 including
in relation to climate change. For example, article 3.5 of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)42 reiterates the language of Article XX of the
GATT,43 and the Paris Agreement is silent on trade44 so parties
largely depend on trade provisions to regulate their domestic climate and energy related policies.45 While several WTO parties
have begun work on a plurilateral agreement on Climate
Change, Trade, and Sustainability,46 more uniform and urgent
action is needed on this issue. Significant precedent exists for
progressive interpretations of Article XX under the DSM in the
context of trade and the environment, and this history of the
DSM demonstrates the “generative quality” of that body47 and
its ability to adapt to changing global circumstances.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is considered
to be the “linchpin” of the entire trading system, and one of the

40. Id. art. XX.
41. CHRIS WOLD, SANFORD GAINES & GREG BLOCK, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND POLICY 83 (2d ed. 2011).
42. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
43. Compare id. art. 3.5 (“Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”), with
GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX (prohibiting measures “which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade”).
44. Paris Agreement, supra note 4.
45. DANIEL BODANSKY, JUTTA BRUNNÉE & LAVANYA RAJAMANI, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 347 (2017) (summarizing the different bodies of
law surrounding international climate change and how each country uses
them).
46. Ronald Steenblick and Susanne Droege, Time to ACCTS? Five Countries Announce New Initiative On Trade And Climate Change, INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Sep. 25, 2019), https://www.iisd.org/articles/time-acctsfive-countries-announce-new-initiative-trade-and-climate-change.
47. Andreas Klasen, Trade: Gridlock and Resilience, in BEYOND GRIDLOCK
74 (Thomas Hale & David Held eds., 2017) (discussing the benefits and detriments of the DSM).
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greatest achievements of the Uruguay Round which led to the
agreement of the WTO.48 It is a unified system which adjudicates
disputes between parties under any of the multilateral agreements. It provides the right of any government to have a panel
process49 and panel decision initiated, as well as an appellate
procedure.50 The dispute settlement body (DSB) administers the
entire process,51 and the WTO system eliminates the ability of
parties to block adoption of panel or appellate body decisions,
providing for a level of “automaticity”52 and therefore certainty.
Together the system is referred to here as the Dispute Settlement Mechanism or DSM.
A panel consists of three independent trade experts,53 and
the Appellate Body consists of a permanent body of seven judges,
with a minimum of three required for the body to operate.54 Once
a dispute has been adjudicated and appealed, the DSM also provides for a remedies phase of the dispute. While voluntary compensation can be provided under Article 22 of the DSU,55 this
has never been used. Instead, countries will usually seek authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations under the
same or another WTO covered agreement.56 This can include imposing tariffs equal to any benefits lost as a result of the other
country’s noncompliance.57 The level of suspension can also be
subject to arbitration under the DSM,58 although the remedy
phase of the DSM can be lengthy.

48. JACKSON, supra note 34, at 124.
49. Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 6, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter
DSU]; see also id., art. 12 (establishing the procedural rules governing the panel
process).
50. Id. art. 17.
51. Id. art. 2.
52. JACKSON, supra note 34, at 125.
53. DSU, supra note 49, art. 8.
54. Id., art. 17. The appellate body must only review issues of law covered
by the panel. Id.
55. Id. art. 22.
56. See e.g., Panel Report, United States–Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS165/AB/R (Dec. 11,
2000) (summarizing the arguments made in favor for and against suspension of
concessions for US imports of certain European commodities).
57. DSU, supra note 49, art. 22.
58. Id.
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The United States started to block the appointment of new
appellate judges in 2018, with terms of two of the remaining
three judges expiring on December 10, 2019.59 This move is
partly a reaction to the “barrage of disputes” being initiated
against the US due to its tariff wars, and partly due to disappointment by the US administration with the outcome of previous disputes.60 The inability of the appellate body to function
nullifies the appellate procedure of the system, and could signal
the “beginning of the end” of the DSM, an increase in tariffs, and
trading relations based on power as opposed to multilaterally
agreed rules.61 Despite this new controversy, the DSM has not
been without its flaws, and has been criticized in the past specifically in relation to its inaccessibility by developing countries.62
A. ARTICLE XX – GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
Article XX exceptions act as a safety valve in the WTO system, providing discretion to countries to avoid existing trade requirements such as national treatment or most favoured nation
provisions, if national priorities justify such deviations.63 Only
some national priorities are exempted from trade disciplines,
and these are reflected in the language of the Article XX.64 They
include exceptions for public health or environmental reasons.65
These exceptions provide policy discretion to member states of
the WTO, provided those states meet the requirements laid out
in Article XX, as interpreted by the DSM. These exceptions could

59. Sabri Ben-Achour, The Top Body at the WTO is About to Stop Functioning, MARKETPLACE (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.marketplace.org/2019/12/05/
the-top-body-wto-stop-functioning/ (arguing the US blocking appointments will
end the functionality of the WTO appellate body).
60. Tom Miles, US Blocks WTO Judge Reappointment as Dispute Settlement Crisis Looms, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-trade-wto-idUSKCN1LC19O (discussing the possible reasoning and implications of the US decision to bock reappointment).
61. WTO Judge Blockage Could Prove “The Beginning of the End,” DW
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/wto-judge-blockage-could-prove-the-beginning-of-the-end/a-51613082.
62. See, e.g., Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector,
8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861, 863 (2005) (“Our starting point is that there is likely to
be substantial ‘missing’ WTO dispute settlement activity related to developing
country trading interests.”).
63. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(b).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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provide critical pathways for developing countries to implement
green industrial policies which have climate benefits.
Existing trade disciplines under the WTO covered agreements include national treatment and most favored nations provisions which aim to ensure non-discrimination between WTO
member states. Non-discrimination has been called the “cardinal
legal principle of the GATT.”66 The principle appears most prominently in the “most favored nation” clause (under Article I)67
and the “national treatment” clause (under Article III) of the
GATT.68 Under “most favored nation,” no member state of the
WTO can afford preferential treatment to a product of one WTO
member unless it offers that same treatment to the “like” products of all WTO members.69 “National treatment” is the most relevant in terms of subsidies for renewable energy. Under these
provisions, a WTO member cannot treat its own domestic product more favorably than any “like” product of any other WTO
member.70
Article XX71 provides countries with a number of general exceptions which can exempt actions which violate “most favored
nation” or “national treatment” principles.72 Application of
66. WOLD et al., supra note 41, at 32.
67. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. I.
68. Id. art. III.
69. WOLD et al., supra note 41, at 180. Article I of the GATT states that no
advantage or privilege can be offered, see GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. I, and
there is extensive jurisprudence at the DSM of what constitutes a “like” product.
In the environmental realm, whether product and production methods constitute a “like” product is a difficult area. See, e.g., CHRISTIANE R. CONRAD, PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS) IN WTO LAW: INTERFACING TRADE
AND SOCIAL GOALS (2011) (discussing the definitions and characteristics of
“like” products under the WTO).
70. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. I & III (illustrating that the jurisprudence on “like” products under both most favored nation and national treatment
have been provided with interchangeable applicability).
71. Id. art. XX.
72. This paper provides a brief overview only of cases on Article XX, while
acknowledging that there is significant literature on the application and interpretation of Article XX in the context of climate change. See, e.g., GARY CLYDE
HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ & JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 86–87 (2009); Luca Rubini & Ingrid Jegou, Who’ll Stop
the Rain? Allocating Emissions Allowances for Free: Environmental Policy, Economics, and WTO Subsidy Law, 1 TRANSNAT’L EVN’T L. 325, 345 (2012); TRACEY
EPPS & ANDREW GREEN, RECONCILING TRADE AND CLIMATE: HOW THE WTO
CAN HELP ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 144–47 (2010); Thomas Cottier &
Tetyana Payosova, Common Concern and the Legitimacy of the WTO in Dealing
with Climate Change, in 9 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND
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Article XX involves a two-step process. The measures taken by a
country must fall under one of the sub-categories of Article XX,
and then must meet the requirements of the opening paragraph
(or “chapeau”) of Article XX.73
Trade and environment disputes at the WTO faced a number of criticisms in the 1990s, largely as a result of the
Tuna/Dolphin74 dispute where the United States attempted to
impose environmental restrictions on fisheries imports by placing an embargo on tuna imports which were caught using purse
seine nets. These nets lead to high levels of dolphin mortality.
WTO decisions in this area fueled protests at the 1999 Ministerial Conference in Seattle, with protesters wearing costumes of
turtles and dolphins.75 Developing countries saw these environmental requirements as “eco-imperialism,”76 which served to
hamper their exports, and as protectionism by developed countries clothed in environmental regulations. Perhaps in response
to these criticisms, the DSM developed more environmentallyfriendly approaches under Articles XX(b) and XX(g).77

TRADE LAW 28 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2016); Michael Hertel, ClimateChange-Related Trade Measures and Article XX: Deﬁning Discrimination in
Light of the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, 45 J.
WORLD TRADE 653 (2011); JACOB WERKSMAN & TREVOR G. HOUSER, COMPETITIVENESS, LEAKAGE AND COMPARABILITY: DISCIPLINING THE USE OF TRADE
MEASURES UNDER A POST-2012 CLIMATE AGREEMENT 3–4 (2008).
73. WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: GATT Exceptions, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2020) (providing a general guidance on performing analysis
under GATT Article XX) [hereinafter WTO Rules].
74. See Panel Report, United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WTO
Doc. WT/DS29/R (unadopted June 16, 1994) (finding the US restrictions were
not justifiable under Article XX(g) as measures relating to the conservation of
dolphins); see also Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct.
12, 1998) (concluding that the US ban fails to meet the requirements of the
chapeau of Article XX). There are a number of iterations of these disputes.
75. While part of the protests concerned DSM decisions concluding that the
US restrictions were discriminatory, much of the protests concerned the negative impacts of free trade generally, workers’ rights, sustainability, environmental as well as social issues. See, e.g., World Trade Organization Protests in Seattle,
SEATTLE.GOV,
http://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-andeducation/digital-document-libraries/world-trade-organization-protests-in-seattle (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
76. BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 45, at 335 (pointing out that developing
countries have expressed the concern that environmental requirements in trade
are “eco-imperialism”).
77. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(b) & (g).
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The two main “environmental” subcategories under Article
XX are XX(b) and XX(g).78 Article XX(b) provides an exception
for measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health . . . .”79 Article XX(g) provides an exception for
measures “relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption . . . .”80
There are several other subcategories of Article XX which have
been invoked in energy disputes, including Article XX(d) which
exempts measures “necessary” to comply with laws or regulations, and Article XX(j) which exempts measures aimed at protecting products which are locally in short supply.81 The language in the subcategories differs significantly, with some
measures required to be “necessary” (e.g., XX(b) and (d)), while
others must just “relate to” the domestic measure (e.g., XX(g)).82
B. ARTICLE XX(b)
Public health is one of the most protected areas in domestic
policy making, and is highly related to both climate change and
the current COVID-19 health crisis. Climate change exacerbates
the health impacts of air pollution, and affects some of the most
vulnerable communities worldwide.83 The disproportionate impact of the COVID-19 crisis has raised public consciousness of
the burdens placed on poor and vulnerable communities.84 This
78. The Relationship Between MEAs and WTO Rules, [2003] 2 Trade Env’t
Rev. 104, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2003/4 (“It has become widely accepted that GATT Article XX (General Exception), and particularly paragraphs
(b) and (g), provides WTO Member with considerable leeway to protect the environment.”).
79. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(b).
80. Id. art. XX(g).
81. Id. art. XX(d) & (j).
82. Compare id. art. XX(b), and id. art. XX(d), with id. art. XX(g).
83. See Myles Allen et al., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE [IPCC], Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. AN
IPCC SPECIAL REPORT 12 (V. Masson-Delmotte et al eds., 2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B8Q-GK4D]; Bruce Bekker et al. ASSOCIATION
OF AIR POLLUTION AND HEAT EXPOSURE WITH PRETERM BIRTH, LOW BIRTH
WEIGHT AND STILLBIRTH IN THE US. A SYSTEMIC REVIEW, Environmental
Health (2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2767260.
84. Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jul. 24, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-
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is also the case in developing countries. Due to its critical relationship with sovereignty and government functions, public
health under Article XX(b), has been afforded the most interpretive deference to domestic policy making by the DSM.
There are different applicable tests for these subcategories.
In order to be “necessary” under Article XX(b), a country must
not have alternative measures which are reasonably available
and not inconsistent with the GATT.85 Article XX(g) requires corollary activity of restrictions on domestic production and consumption, requiring that countries display some domestic environmental activity.86 Two disputes which concerned an import
ban on asbestos by France87 and an import ban on tires by Brazil88 provided generous interpretations of Article XX(b). In these
cases, domestic policies designed to reduce risk from asbestos fibers and mosquito-born diseases respectively were held to fall
within the subcategory of Article XX(b), even though alternatives were available. The Appellate Body afforded significant
deference to domestic policy making, specifically recognizing
that complex public health or environmental problems such as
climate change must be tackled with multifaceted and comprehensive policies with interacting measures, the results of which
may only manifest over time.89 The import ban on retreaded
tires was considered in the broader context of Brazil’s comprehensive strategy to deal with waste tires, and the Appellate Body
ethnicity.html (“Inequities in the social determinants of health, such as poverty
and healthcare access, affecting these groups are interrelated and influence a
wide range of health and quality-of-life outcomes and risks.”).
85. E.g., United States–Tuna, supra note 74, at ¶ 5.35 (confirming that the
term “necessary” in Article XX(b) means a contracting party has no available
alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which
is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions); see also Panel Report, United
States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.26–6.29
WTO Doc. WT/DS2/9, (adopted May 20, 1996) (finding the US baseline establishment method not “necessary” under Article XX(b)).
86. See WTO Rules, supra note 73 (“[I]n order to be justified under Article
XX(g), a measure affecting imports must be applied ‘in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’ (the even-handedness requirement).”).
87. Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/R (adopted Sept. 18,
2000).
88. Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Measuring Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007).
89. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 151 (admitting that the import ban tackles certain
complex public health or environmental problems).
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determined that the import ban did make a material contribution to Brazil’s overall domestic objectives.90 In Brazil–Taxation,
the Panel specifically articulated that a policy to reduce carbon
emissions would be covered by Article XX(b), as it would be a
policy designed to protect human life or health.91 While the elements of a renewable energy policy targeted at preserving a stable climate are likely to qualify under Article XX(b), economic
elements under the same policy such as local content requirements may not be considered a legitimate objective,92 and may
not be considered “necessary” as set out below.
Existing jurisprudence points to three elements which are
relied upon to determine whether a measure is “necessary” under Article XX(b). These include whether the measure is apt to
make a “material contribution” to the purpose of the policy.93 A
genuine relationship of ends and means should be identified for
this element.94 Therefore both the renewable energy policy and
any protectionist economic measures within it should materially
contribute to emissions reductions. This is where empirical evidence put forward by a country of reduced costs and increased
dissemination from past local content or other economic elements could be persuasive, even if these occurred over time. The
Brazil–Retreaded Tyres case gave specific latitude to complex
public health or environmental problems such as climate
change, stating that the benefits of policies may only manifest
over time.95
The second element of the test of necessity is whether the
measure is proportional to the values the policy seeks to protect—the more vital the interests or values, the easier it would

90. Id. at ¶ 154 (“[W]e wish to underscore that the Import Ban must be
viewed in the broader context of the comprehensive strategy designed and implemented by Brazil to deal with waste tyres.”).
91. Panel Report, Brazil–Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and
Charges, ¶ 7.880, WTO Doc. WT/DS472/R (adopted Aug. 30, 2017).
92. See Michael A. Mehling et al., Designing Border Carbon Adjustments
for Enhanced Climate Action, 113:3 AM. J. INT’L L. 433, 465 (2019) (“By contrast
[to the reduction of CO2 emissions], an economic rationale . . . would not be considered a legitimate objective under the exceptions of Article XX(b).”).
93. See Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 88, at ¶¶ 151, 210 (describing
the conditions under which an import ban would be permissible under GATT
Article XX(b) and held to materially contribute to achieving an objective).
94. See id. at ¶ 145 (examining whether “there is a genuine relationship of
ends and means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue”).
95. Id. at ¶151; Mehling et al., supra note 92, at 465.
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be to pass the necessity test.96 The urgency and global attention
focused on climate change, the increasing public health emergencies associated with the impacts of climate change, including
increased air pollution, and COVID-19, combined with multilateral and almost universal action to ratify the Paris Agreement,97
suggest that a policy targeted at addressing climate change
would pass this second element.98
The third element requires that there is no alternative
measure which would achieve the same aim but in a less traderestrictive manner.99 Here the burden shifts to the complainant
in a dispute.100 The Appellate Body has been careful to consider
practice and economic needs of developing countries in the context of this third element. In Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, expensive
technological fixes such as tire recycling facilities were not reasonably available, and therefore the domestic policy of promoting domestic retreading of tires was deemed to be “necessary”
under Article XX(b).101 The economic and administrative realities of countries were carefully considered by the DSM in the
context of the comprehensiveness and different components of
the policy.
C. ARTICLE XX(g)
Article XX(g) is the main environmental exception in the
WTO. It has traditionally been given less interpretive deference
than Article XX(b), but it has a weaker standard to qualify than
XX(b) does. Article XX(g) has its own unique set of tests, and
only requires that a domestic environmental policy relates to national conservation aims.102 The first element of the test is that
96. See, e.g., EC–Asbestos supra note 87, at ¶¶ 8.172, 8.179, 8.207 (describing necessity in terms of proportional value and availability of alternative
measures that would be consistent with the GATT).
97. Paris Agreement, supra note 4.
98. See Mehling et al., supra note 92, at 466 (asserting that the vital nature
of climate issues make broad climate measures likely to be considered proportional).
99. EC–Asbestos, supra note 87, at ¶ 8.172 (stating that past panels evaluated necessity primarily on if other measures were available either consistent
with or less inconsistent with the GATT).
100. See id., at ¶ 8.78–79 (applying GATT rules affirmed in United States –
Shirts and Blouses in confirming the burden of proof rests on the complainant).
101. Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 88, at ¶¶ 162–66, 171–72 (analyzing the alternatives to retreading in Brazil and concluding that none were reasonably available).
102. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(g).
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the resource must qualify as an exhaustible natural resource.
For example, in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute, the Appellate Body
confirmed that turtles qualified as an “exhaustible natural resource,” providing a very broad interpretation under Article
XX(g) of that term.103 The US imposed import restrictions on
shrimp unless a turtle excluder device was used to catch them.104
In the past, clean air was deemed by the DSM to be an exhaustible natural resource in the US–Gasoline case.105 In this case,
the US Clean Air Act established baseline rules for gasoline sold
on the US market in order to regulate emissions.106 The Appellate Body took an evolutionary approach to the concept of exhaustible natural resources in this case, in light of contemporary
concerns.107
The second element of the test is that a measure must relate
to, or be reasonably related to, the domestic policy goal.108 The
term “relating to” has been deemed to be a lower standard than
“necessary,” under Article XX(b), but must be primarily aimed
at conservation of an exhaustible natural resource.109 Again for
the protectionist elements of a renewable energy policy, they
must clearly relate to the overall objective of the policy.
The third and final element of the test is that the domestic
measure must be made in conjunction with domestic restrictions
either on production or consumption.110 In China–Rare Earth,
the US objected to export restrictions imposed by China on the
103. US–Shrimp, supra note 74, at Appellate Body Report, ¶ 128 (determining that the term was broader than just the inclusion of “mineral” or “non-living” resources).
104. Id. at ¶ 2.
105. US–Gasoline, supra note 85, at ¶¶ 6.21, 6.37.
106. Id. at ¶ 2.1.
107. See US–Shrimp, supra note 74, at ⁋129 (noting that the GATT Article
XX(g) exception “must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment”).
108. Id. at ¶ 141 (asserting that the shrimp import restrictions in question
were permissible as they were limited in scope and furthered the policy objective, or were “reasonably related to the ends”).
109. See US–Gasoline, supra 85, at 14–18 (discussing “relating to” and “necessary” in GATT XX(b) and XX(g)).
110. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China–Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, ¶ 5.132, WTO Doc.
WT/DS431/AB/R (adopted Aug. 29, 2014) (“We consider that the phrase ‘made
effective in conjunction with’ requires that, when international trade is restricted, effective restrictions are also imposed on domestic production or consumption.”).
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export of rare earth materials which are critical components to
batteries in renewable energy as well as technology and defense
equipment.111 Here, the Appellate Body did confirm that a member state must impose “real restrictions” on domestic production
or consumption that reinforce and complement the restrictions
on international trade, particularly where there is large domestic consumption.112 This is often referred to as the “even-handedness” approach, and may require that domestic restrictions in
greenhouse gas emissions be implemented in conjunction with
policies to enhance the production of renewables.113
D. ARTICLE XX—THE CHAPEAU
Once a domestic policy meets the requirements of the individual provisions of Article XX, it must then satisfy the requirements of the “chapeau.” The DSM has a progressive interpretive
history in the area of Articles XX(b) and (g) when interpreting
the coverage and applicability of the scope of these sub-paragraphs to domestic measures. The more difficult hurdle for countries to overcome is the opening paragraph of Article XX (referred to as the “chapeau”). The chapeau is more targeted not at
the content of the measure or the aim of the domestic policy, but
in the manner of their application. More specifically, whether
the measures are applied in a way that is discriminatory.
The DSM has in the past, through progressive interpretive
approaches, provided significant domestic policy space for countries to implement trade-restrictive measures provided they
make a material contribution to legitimate domestic policies under Articles XX(b) and (g). Most problematic for protectionist
measures would be the chapeau of Article XX. It requires that
any measures applied by a party are not applied in a manner
that would constitute “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or “a disguised restriction on international
trade.”114 The chapeau does not prohibit discrimination, but only
seeks to prevent abusive discrimination.115
Despite the strict language, judicial flexibility has also been
applied under the chapeau in the past. While the DSM
111. Id. at ¶ 1.2.
112. Id. at ¶ 5.132.
113. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 5.93, 5.101.
114. GATT 1994, supra note 5 (requiring that each of these standards must
be met, meaning all are applicable).
115. WOLD ET AL., supra note 41, at 275.
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determined that the US fisheries import restrictions for shrimp
not caught using a turtle excluder device fell under Article XX(g)
in the US–Shrimp dispute, the measure failed the test under the
chapeau.116 The US then revised its approach to the import restrictions by attempting to negotiate a multilateral solution with
the affected parties. Even though no multilateral solution was
agreed upon by all parties, good faith negotiation efforts by the
US were sufficient for the revised measure to survive the chapeau test.117 This added a largely procedural component to the
chapeau—merely entering into good faith negotiations was sufficient. The emphasis was placed on fairness and due process,
which was achieved through the multilateral negotiations. Here,
a less stringent approach to the language of the chapeau demonstrates a preference by the Appellate Body for multilateralism.118
Finally under the chapeau, any discriminatory element of a
measure will be examined against its ability to be reconciled
with or rationally related to its policy objectives as provisionally
justified under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX.119 While
the climate elements of any renewable energy policy would easily pass muster under the chapeau, the economic portions of such
a policy, such as local content requirements, would have to be
designed and applied in such a way that it necessarily leads to
emissions reductions,120 through increased manufacture, installation, and dissemination of renewable technology. While this
may be easier to prove through domestic dissemination, export
activities may be more difficult to justify under the chapeau. Any
blatantly protectionist measure targeted at export activities may
struggle to survive some of these tests as it becomes more difficult to tie such restrictions directly to emissions reductions, particularly domestic reductions. However, a policy that is specifically tied to domestic emissions reductions, and therefore

116. US–Shrimp, supra note 74, at ⁋187.
117. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia
⁋153–54, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter US–
Shrimp Art. 21.5]; WOLD ET AL., supra note 41, at 275.
118. BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 45, at 335.
119. Appellate Body Report, Eur. Communities–Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ⁋ 5.318, WT/DS400/AB/R (adopted
June 18, 2014).
120. Mehling et al., supra note 92, at 470.
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climate benefits, could benefit from progressive treatment under
Article XX, including its chapeau.
II. ENERGY, TRADE, AND CLIMATE CHANGE
The relationship between energy, trade, and climate change
at the international level is patchy at best, and contradictory at
worst. Climate change goals cannot be achieved without major
energy transitions away from fossil fuels. After the Paris Agreement, the overlap between trade and climate change has taken
on a “new urgency.”121 However, the “inescapable nexus between
trade and climate change . . . is not yet reflected in either of the
agendas [or agreements] of the . . . WTO or the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).”122
Without new WTO rules or a revised approach under the DSM,
the legitimacy and efficiency of both the trade and climate regimes may be undermined.123
Meeting the long-term temperature goals in the Paris
Agreement requires a large-scale, global transition away from
fossil fuels and towards renewable energy.124 Parties agreed to
reach peaking of global greenhouse gases as soon as possible,
and achieve a balance between emissions and removals in the
second half of the century.125 The architecture of the Paris
Agreement focuses on national action to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, and while renewable energy is not specifically provided as a mandate under the Agreement, decarbonizing the
world’s energy system is “by far the primary method of stabilising global temperature increases.”126 The bottom-up architecture of the Paris Agreement also means that its success will rest
primarily on domestic implementation on the basis of nationally
determined contributions of both developed and developing

121. Michael O. Moore, Carbon Safeguard? Managing the Friction Between
Trade Rules and Climate Policy, 51 J. World Trade 43, 45 (2017).
122. JAMES BACCHUS, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., TRIGGERING THE TRADE TRANSITION: THE G20’S ROLE IN RECONCILING RULES FOR
TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE VI, 1 (2018).
123. Id. at 1–2.
124. INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RETHINKING ENERGY 2017: ACCELERATING THE GLOBAL ENERGY TRANSFORMATION 23–24 (2017).
125. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, art. 4 (Dec. 12, 2015) (explaining that this provision is commonly understood to mean net zero emissions).
126. Dent, supra note 12, at 2.
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countries—developing countries are now important partners in
the transition to renewable energy.127
Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement have a high policy profile and will likely include more government support for renewable energy, putting them in increasing conflict with WTO rules where protectionist policies are
involved and at increased risk of scrutiny by trade partners.128
The Paris Agreement provides discretion to the parties as to
which specific support measures and policy instruments are
most appropriate.129 However, the WTO does not provide such
policy flexibility, as any measure must comply with trade disciplines in the WTO covered agreements, enforceable through the
DSM.
International trade not only allows firms to increase production but can also aid in diffusing clean energy technology, which
is especially important for developing countries where the “scope
for achieving marginal gains in environmental welfare and energy efficiency are generally greatest.”130 Promoting international trade in clean energy can make important contributions
to climate change mitigation through business and market expansion efforts.131 A “cascade of climate-friendly, trade-impacting measures” could lead to climate stabilization.132 “Climate
measures affect trade[,]” but also “[t]rade measures affect the
climate.”133 Emerging economies focused on export of subsidized
renewable energy technology, have domestic policies which are

127. Provisions under the prior Kyoto Protocol imposed targeted emissions
reductions on developed countries only. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/
Add.1 art. 2(1)(a).
128. Moore, supra note 121, at 47–48 (describing potential conflicts between
climate measures and trade rules).
129. Gracia Marín Durán, Sheltering Government Support to “Green” Electricity: The European Union and the World Trade. Organization, 67 INT’L. &
COMP. L. Q. 130, 134–35 (2018). But cf. BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 45, at 347–
48 (arguing that the UNFCCC regime therefore neither restricts nor condones
the use of trade measures and instead refers parties to existing trade law).
130. Dent, supra note 12, at 728.
131. Id. at 728–29.
132. Juscelino F. Colares, Paths to Carbon Stabilization: How Foreign Carbon-Restricting Reforms Will Affect US Industry, Climate Policy and the Prospects of a Binding Emission Reduction Treaty, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 281, 289
(2013).
133. BACCHUS, supra note 122, at 1.
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likely to violate trade rules, including the SCM Agreement.134
This is why many emerging economies have been the subject to
WTO disputes in relation to their renewable energy policies. The
SCM Agreement focuses on trade flows between a subsidyproviding WTO member and another WTO member.135
A. ENERGY, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Developing countries are now major partners in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, and meeting its global temperature goals. Developing countries have a large role to play in
the climate, energy, and trade nexus. Growth in greenhouse gas
emissions in the next few decades will come primarily from developing countries, particularly China and India.136 As law
scholars Wu and Salzman note, “as go India and China with
greenhouse gases, so goes the world.”137 But the international
energy architecture is, as currently formulated, ill-suited to
tackle the conflicts between growing energy demands and climate impacts. It is now faced with a number of difficult tasks,
including ensuring security of supply and demand, mitigating
the effects of climate change, “promot[ing] energy efficiency and
renewables[,]” “dampen[ing] price volatility[,]” and “reduc[ing]
energy poverty . . . .”138 “[E]merging economies such as India,
China, Russia, Brazil[,] and South Africa play a vital role in influencing the contemporary energy landscape”;139 they are increasingly driving global energy demand but are also carving out
economic development space in the clean energy arena through
green industrial policies.140

134. See, e.g., Espa & Durán, supra note 21, at 624–28 (discussing distinctions important to determining “the WTO compatibility of different categories
of [renewable energy] subsidies”).
135. Id. at 625.
136. WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (2008).
137. Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and Environmental Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV.
401, 449 (2014).
138. Sijbren de Jong & Jan Wouters, Institutional Actors in International
Energy Law in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 18, 19
(Kim Talus ed., Edward Elgar 2014).
139. Id. at 25.
140. Id. at 25–32 (discussing the influence emerging economies have in discussions of green energy forums).

2020]

RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRADE

29

The switch away from carbon to silicon in renewable energy
will have global winners and losers.141 Governments in developing countries are already starting to face litigation from climatevulnerable constituents.142 These countries are being sent mixed
messages: to reduce emissions while being positioned as a respondent in WTO disputes, largely as a result of disputes initiated by developed countries disputing pro-climate (but also prodevelopment) policies.143 Developing countries have pressing
poverty eradication and energy poverty needs and are facing
stark energy choices.144 The need to reduce global GHG emissions has become so dire largely due to developed countries’ historic inaction and irresponsibility: not making lifestyle “sacrifices necessary to move toward . . . lower per capita emissions
rates.”145 However, many of the world’s carbon intensive (or carbon major) corporations are in fact state-controlled corporations
located in the developing world.146

141. See INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 124, at 9, 20, 23,
25–26 (describing the net-zero relationship between reliance on renewable
energy and reliance on traditional fossil fuel energy).
142. See generally Joana Setzer & Lisa Benjamin, Climate Litigation in the
Global South: Constraints and Innovations, 9 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 77, 78
(2019) (investigating the Global South’s role in affecting environmental justice
through climate litigation); Jacqueline Peel & Jolene Lin, Transnational Climate Litigation: The Contribution of the Global South, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 679,
679 (2019) (addressing the impact of climate litigation in the Global South on
transnational climate litigation); Joana Setzer & Lisa Benjamin, Climate
Change Litigation in the Global South: Filling In Gaps 114 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 56, (2020); JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE
LITIGATION: REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY (James Crawford &
John S. Bell eds., 2015) (providing an overview of climate litigation generally).
143. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 449; See, e.g., Peel & Lin, supra note
142, at 702 (writing that cases are being brought in the Global South in part to
“seek[] accountability from Global North governments and corporations for
their failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and decarbonize their economic
activities” and to “support[] . . . arguments that the failure to address climate
change has far-reaching adverse consequences for vulnerable populations that
make a negligible contribution toward causing climate change”).
144. See id. at 693–94 (noting that many cases in the Global South focus
primarily on policy concerns focusing on topics such as economic development
and poverty alleviation, with climate change arguments taking a secondary position).
145. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 444.
146. For example, Sinopec in China and Saudi Aramco in Saudi Arabia. See
generally Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane
Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854-2010, 122 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 229, 231 (2013) (noting that out of the 90 entities with the largest fossil
fuel emissions, 31 are state-owned). See also Thomas Hale, “All Hands on Deck”:
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Developing countries face additional challenges promoting
renewable energy, including limited institutional, financial, and
human resources. As a result, government intervention is often
required.147 There has been limited progress in the last two decades on the transition to green economic growth, in part due to
the lack of global transition policy frameworks.148 Transition
pathways are most effective if they include long-term visions, interim transition goals, pathways for different actors, and experimental policy learning.149 This often involves green industrial
policy formation in emerging economies.150 Industrial policy formation experienced a resurgence after the global financial crisis.151 Emerging economies that found themselves in relatively
stable macro-economic situations after the 2008 financial crisis
were more able to afford large programmatic approaches on
green growth.152 These countries were also keen to adopt industrial policies which could help sustain their growth and spur on
new employment creation.153 Governments remain one of the
main sources of incentives to protect the environment through
domestic incentives and environmental public policy making.154
B. GREEN INDUSTRIAL POLICY MAKING
There has been a reinvigoration of industrial policy making
in both developed and developing countries. This has only escalated in the context of both the climate crisis and the COVID-19
crisis, with some public health-related transitions including an
emphasis on renewable energy and green industrial policy
The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action, 16(3) GLOB. ENV’T POL. 12
(2016); THOMAS HALE, THE ROLE OF SUB-STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE PROCESSES, Research Paper (Nov. 2018) (providing an
overview of the importance of non-state actors, including corporations, to the
new Paris climate regime).
147. Heede, supra note 146.
148. Pablo Burkolter & Leisa Perch, Greening Growth in the South: Practice,
Policies and New Frontiers, 21 S. AFR. J. INT’L AFFS. 235, 235 (2014).
149. Kemp & Never, supra note 22, at 69.
150. See id.
151. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Justin Yifu Lin & Celestin Monga, Introduction to
THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY REVOLUTION I: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT BEYOND
IDEOLOGY 1 (Joseph E. Sitglitz & Justin Yifu Lin eds., 2013).
152. Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 248.
153. Id.
154. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, Greening Global Value Chains: Some Implementation Challenges 14 (Green Growth Knowledge Platform, Working Paper No. 6613, 2013).
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making. In order to make rapid progress towards 2030 emission
reduction goals, very large emitters such as the US, EU, China,
India, Russia, Brazil, and Indonesia must make significant emissions reductions.155 Green industrial policy making by developing countries can be an area for real progress in the transition to
renewable energy, and litigation of energy disputes is now an
important part of the global climate regime.156 The actions of
these countries are important as their domestic policy decisions
on energy can significantly affect global climate trajectories.157
However, these policies can have mixed motives, including both
environmental and economic protection,158 and therefore are
vulnerable to trade rules.
Emerging economies are concerned about their own development trajectories and needs.159 Therefore, the transition to
cleaner energy is often intertwined within industrial policies for
the protection of domestic industries, and in some cases, with
forging an economic pathway to global dominance in clean energy technologies.160 Developing countries need access to clean
energy technology in order “to diversify their energy sources and
to reduce their carbon emissions [and aims to do so] without hindering their economic development.”161 “[O]f the [twenty-seven]
countries . . . [which] . . . make up 90% of the global green economy, eight are from the [G]lobal South[: ]Argentina, Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa[,] and Turkey[].”162 A subset of these same countries have green industrial
policies that have been disputed by the WTO: Argentina, Indonesia, India, and China.163 These countries have adopted a
155. THE FREDERICK S. PARDEE CTR. & THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INITIATRADE IN THE BALANCE: RECONCILING TRADE AND CLIMATE POLICY 19
(Nov. 2016).
156. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 474.
157. For example, China is currently facing energy risks due to the Middle
East crisis and United States sanctions on Iran. See Michael Lelyveld, China’s
Energy Risks Rise with Iran Sanctions, RADIO FREE ASIA (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/risks10212019112804.html.
158. Carolyn Fischer & Timothy Meyer, Baptists and Bootleggers in the Biodiesel Trade: EU-Biodiesel (Indonesia), 19 WORLD TRADE REV. 297, 298 (2020).
159. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 473.
160. Id. at 473–74.
161. WORLD BANK, supra note 136, at 73.
162. Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 237.
163. See, e.g., id. at 251(discussing challenges at the WTO to Chinese trade
policies on solar panels); see also INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., TRADE AND
TIVE,
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number of strategies across domestic policy making, including
local content requirements which seek to foster local employment and competitive domestic industries in the solar energy
area, mercantilist export control and export price increases in
biofuels, and subsidies and export restraints in wind power.164
The strategies used by developing countries have to date been
unsuccessful at the WTO.165
Local content requirements in particular make public support for manufacturing of renewable technology subject to a certain percentage of domestically produced components or labour
sources. There is mixed evidence on how successful local content
requirements in particular are in terms of their environmental
aims.166 While they certainly reduce competition by forcing reliance on local suppliers,167 there is an argument that supporting
local infant industries can allow those industries to mature and
become competitive, ultimately lowering prices globally for renewable technology.168 In addition, in large emerging economies,
economies of scale may in fact lead to lower prices for renewables
both domestically and internationally.169 These can in turn

GREEN ECONOMY – A HANDBOOK 93–94 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing the large and
increasing number of national trade remedy cases, including one brought
against China).
164. See, e.g., China–Rare Earth, supra note 110 (discussing export controls
imposed on important raw materials).
165. See, e.g., id. ⁋⁋ 6.1–6.4 (upholding a panel report finding the Chinese
measures violated WTO rules).
166. INT’L INST.FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra note 163, at 95.
167. For an example, see generally AARON COSBEY & LUCA RUBINI, DOES IT
FIT? AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
MEASURES AND OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF CANADA-RENEWABLE ENERGY/FIT
DISPUTES (2013); JAN-CHRISTOPH KUNTZE & TOM MOERENHOUT, LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY INDUSTRY – A GOOD
MATCH? (2013).
168. INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra note 163, at 94–95. Feed-in
tariffs for green electricity which are well-designed and well-implemented have
been identified as one of the better types of subsidies. INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 17, at 152.
169. Cf. INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY supra note 27, 40–41
(discussing various ways countries are developing and financially benefiting
from renewable energy economies); Charlie Campbell, China is Bankrolling
Green Energy Projects Around the World, TIME (Nov. 1, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://time.com/5714267/china-green-energy/ (explaining how China’s leading
position in the development of renewable technologies allows for national firms
to fund energy development worldwide); Dominic Chiu, The East is Green:
China’s Global Leadership on Renewable Energy, 13 NEW PERSP. FOREIGN
POL’Y 6 (2019), https://www.csis.org/east-green-chinas-global-leadership-
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increase competitive advantage, particularly in commodities,
even by using imperfect monopoly competition.170 Consistently
applied subsidies can provide certainty to infant and desirable
industries such as renewable energy development.171 The International Energy Agency has projected that investment in renewable energy will need to increase substantially in the next decade, reaching $400 billion by 2030 to meet the goal of limiting
the peak of energy-related global greenhouse gas emissions to
around 2020.172 It is likely, therefore, that all countries, including developed countries, will continue to rely on renewable energy subsidies in the near future.
Many developing countries involved in WTO disputes have
carved out ‘green’ industrial policy space which has a dual purpose of protecting and bolstering their own domestic markets in
both natural resources and clean energy technology while
achieving environmental goals. “[M]any . . . industrial policy
measures [are used] to strengthen the domestic production and
technological capacities of [domestic] producers,” thereby achieving poverty reduction and development goals.173 Emerging economies have invested resources in developing green industrial
policies to meet both environmental and developmental goals.174
These goals are often intricately intertwined, and developing

renewable-energy (arguing renewable energy usage will increase globally as a
result of China’s development of and leadership in the sector); WOLD ET AL.,
supra note 41, at 531 (analyzing how the use of domestic subsidies can lower
prices internationally).
170. See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(1990) (explaining a theory of international trade that emphasizes increasing
returns and imperfect competition); John Romalis, Factor Proportions and the
Structure of Commodity Trade, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 67 (2004) (examining how
the commodity trade is impacted by the way countries utilize their abundant
factors of production).
171. See, e.g., Melissa Powers, Sustainable Energy Subsidies, 43 ENV’T L.
211, 231 (2013) (writing that the wind industry would do well (and flourish)
with consistent and stable subsidies).
172. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK SPECIAL REPORT 13 (2015), https://webstore.iea.org/weo-2015special-report-energy-and-climate-change.
173. See Dent, supra note 12, at 732.
174. See, e.g., Dongsheng Zang, From Environment to Energy: China’s Reconceptualization of Climate Change, 27 WIS. INT’L L. J. 543, 562–64 (2009) (explaining that China reconceptualised climate change from an environmental to
an energy issues between 1989 to 2009, primarily due to growing energy needs
and energy security concerns as well as growing international pressure to manage emissions).
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countries may be loath to remove the developmental aspects of
their clean energy policies.175 There may not be one principal
driver behind these policies, but economic, social and environmental benefits may be equally influential.176 For example, it is
estimated that “between 2005 and 2020, thirty million new
green jobs . . . will be created in China.”177 India’s solar mission
plan is explicitly concerned with energy security, energy access
and energy poverty issues, as well as domestic industry development, combining climate, social, and economic development concerns.178
Industrial policy mechanisms may have environmental
aims but also trigger competitiveness concerns over rent-seeking
with domestic industry promotion plans, as governments position their industries for the energy transition.179 In some disputes, largely in renewable energy and biofuels, developed countries are also employing protectionist methods.180 Conflicting
trade disciplines can hamper the ability of green growth strategies to contribute to poverty alleviation and more equitable and
inclusive development within these countries.181
III. ENERGY AT THE WTO
The relationship between developing countries and environmental and energy policies and the WTO has been fractious. Developed country environmental policies which were supported by
the DSM were seen as protectionism by developing countries,
dressed up in environmental policies. There have also been no
disputes at the WTO regarding fossil fuel subsidies, but a

175. See id.
176. Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 252–53.
177. Id. at 239.
178. See India–Solar, infra section IV.A.3.
179. Bradly J. Condon, Disciplining Clean Energy Subsidies to Speed the
Transition to a Low-Carbon World, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 675, 677 (2017).
180. See Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 251.
181. See id., at 252. There has also been progressive economic and regulatory
interdependence between countries, leading to diffusion of policy formation
from the core to the periphery. See Emily Jones and Alexandra Zeitz, Regulatory
Convergence in the Financial Periphery: How Interdependence Shapes Regulators’ Decision, 63 INT’L STUDS. Q. 908 (2019). Support for renewable energy policy formation could serve as a regulatory diffusion device as well, leading to
increased South-South collaboration on renewable energy development and diffusion.
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number of disputes on renewable energy policies.182 Most of
these renewable energy disputes at the WTO now involve developing countries’ domestic policies. And so the WTO’s own approach to renewable energy has been inconsistent at best, and
climate-unfriendly at worst. Article XX exceptions have either
not been relied upon by developing countries, or dismissed as inapplicable by the DSM in renewable energy disputes. These provisions could be useful in defending domestic renewable energy
policies in particular, but they have to be more effectively used
by countries, tied more closely to stricter domestic policies, and
considered more thoughtfully by the DSM.
Energy was not specifically regulated by the WTO as part of
a separate, distinct energy agreement due to historical reasons.
At the time of the formation of the GATT, liberalization of the
energy market was not a political priority.183 At that time, the
energy market was heavily cartelized, dominated largely by fossil fuel companies and state-run monopolies.184 In addition, the
WTO has a “market access bias,” so the rules place emphasis on
reducing import tariffs.185 However, problems in global energy
trade now revolve primarily around export taxes or restrictions,
not import tariffs.186 In the 1970s, the oil crisis did put export
restrictions on the WTO negotiating table but no agreement
could be reached on the issue.187 In particular, “resource-endowed countries” were wary of agreeing to “binding rules on
trade in natural resources” as well as environmental provisions,
due to a fear of green protectionism by developed countries.188

182. See Part IV, infra.
183. See Yulia Selivanova, The WTO Agreements and Energy, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 275, 275–76 (Kim Talus ed., Edward Elgar Pub. 2014).
184. See Anna Marhold, The WTO and Energy: Fuel for Debate, 2 EUR. SOC’Y
INT’L. L. REFLECTIONS 1, 2 (Sept. 30 2013), https://esil-sedi.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Marhold-ESIL-Reflections.pdf.
185. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted).
186. See id. (discussing that while Article XI of the GATT covers both import
and export restrictions, it covers only quantitative export limits but not export
duties, taxes or charges); see also ALAN YANOVICH, REGULATION OF ENERGY IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1 (Yulia Selivanova ed., 2011). However, the
Trump Administration may have reinvigorated the use of tariffs in international trade.
187. Selivanova, supra note 183, at 276.
188. Id. at 277; Carolyn Deere Birkbeck, 20 Years of Debate on Environment,
Trade and Sustainable Development at the WTO: A Literature Review (1995-
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The present-day energy sector is now more complex and
stratified and “encompasses fossil and non-fossil fuels and energy including oil, gas, coal, wood, electricity, atomic energy[,] . . . solar, wind, wave and tidal [energy], . . . [and] biofuels.”189 The changing nature of energy sources means WTO
covered agreements are directly applicable to the governance of
these energy sources.190 Despite the diversification of energy
sources, energy is still different from other industries due to its
physical characteristics, leading to natural monopolies where
energy resources are located (often in developing countries).191
The bulk of international energy regulation remains at the domestic level, with the role of international law in addressing energy remaining “unclear and unsettled,”192 despite the fact that
“energy trade has transcended national borders.”193
Energy straddles both goods and services at the WTO, as its
physical properties are often not severable from the production
process and channels of distribution—electricity is dependent
upon networks and grids for distribution but renewable energy
technology is traded more freely across borders.194 As such,
treatment of energy within the WTO covered agreements is fragmented, leading some commentators to argue it would be better
dealt with under a WTO Framework Agreement on Energy.195
Unfortunately, there is little hope for progressive development
of the legislative agenda at the WTO at the moment,196 and in
the absence of a cohesive legislative approach to energy, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) has been the main mechanism which has managed the relationship of energy under the
WTO.197

2015) 19–20 (U. of Oxford, Glob. Econ. Governance Programme, Working Paper
No. 114, 2016).
189. Thomas Cottier et al., Energy in WTO Law and Policy 8 (NCCR Trade
Regulation, Working Paper No. 2009/25, 2009), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_7may10_e.pdf.
190. Id. at 1.
191. Id. at 2.
192. Id. at 7.
193. Kim Talus, Internationalization of Energy Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 5 (Kim Talus ed., Edward Elgar 2014).
194. Cottier et al., supra note 189, at 8–9.
195. Id. at 2–3, 8.
196. See, e.g., Ben-Achour, supra note 59 (discussing current US opposition
to WTO action).
197. Cottier et al., supra note 189 at 1–2.
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A. THE DSM AND EMERGING ENERGY DISPUTES
Energy disputes at the WTO are on the rise, but only renewable energy policies have been subject to dispute. Article XX exceptions failed to provide cover for these policies, leading to detrimental climate impacts in some cases. Since 2010, there have
been a number of energy-related disputes adjudicated at the
DSM. Trade flows as well as trade disputes in clean energy are
dominated by a select group of countries, often correlated with
the largest global emitters, traders, and markets for clean energy investments.198 The role and involvement of developing
countries in these disputes is increasing, and as a result, new
types of arguments, such as the principle of sustainable development, are being employed by these countries in order to attempt
to bolster and reorient existing GATT defenses in a more climate-friendly, but especially development-friendly direction. Reliance on the DSM alone to adjudicate conflicts between trade
and climate is less than ideal. “The shoddy structure of the SCM
Agreement, the poor judgment of WTO tribunals, the consensus
blocking squabbling of WTO negotiations, and the mixed signals
of energy markets have combined to create a perfect storm for
the transition to clean energy.”199 The parties in these disputes
have had to rely on agreements and provisions within the WTO
covered agreements, which arguably do not cater specifically for
energy, climate change, or sustainable development concerns.
Ultimately both legislative amendments and jurisprudential adjustments will be necessary to have a more cohesive approach to
trade, energy, and climate change at the WTO.
Despite there being no energy agreement at the WTO, energy jurisprudence has had to be developed at the WTO by necessity, due to the sheer number of disputes being invoked between developed and developing countries, as well as the
changing nature of energy sources.200 The first biofuels case

198. Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz & Mahesh Sugathan, Enabling the Energy
Transition and Scale-Up of Clean Energy Technologies: Options for the Global
Trade System- Synthesis of Policy Options, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 933, 937 (2017).
199. Bradly J. Condon, Disciplining Clean Energy Subsidies to Speed the
Transition to a Low-Carbon World, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 675, 677–678 (2017).
But see Espa and Durán, supra note 21, at 622 (arguing that there is very little
conflict between the WTO and the SCM Agreement and climate change).
200. Droege et al. supra note 13, at 3.
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occurred in 2012,201 and the most recent substantive decision on
an energy dispute was published in June 2019.202 Some trends
are identified. The original set of energy disputes saw developed
countries submitting complaints against the domestic policies of
other developed countries. Soon after that, the domestic policies
of developing countries became a target, largely for developed
countries. More recently, India has disputed renewable policies
in eight different US states.203 In addition, developing countries
are now challenging other developing countries in relation to
their domestic policies, with Argentina requesting consultations
with Peru over domestic biofuels policies.204 As a result, domestic
policies of both developed and emerging economies are now vulnerable to challenges.
Article XX defenses, in all cases in which they were invoked
by these countries, have failed to justify green industrial policies—largely due to those policies’ protectionist elements.205 In
addition, even where developing countries have found success in
the biofuels disputes in law, their “successes” are being frustrated by developed countries through use of protectionist
measures. These developments mean it is more and more likely
that developing countries will employ strategic or convenient
compliance strategies in order to further their developmental objectives unless an approach can be adopted which bridges the
divide between the green industrial policy aims of these countries and WTO jurisprudence.
IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY DISPUTES AT THE WTO
Energy sources are diverse, and are dealt with in different
WTO covered agreements depending on their typology. 206 As a
result, different and competing forms of energy are subject to
strongly divergent international trade rules.207 The first
201. Request for Consultation by Argentina, European Union and a Member
State—Certain Measures Concerning the Importation of Biodiesels, WTO Doc.
WT/DS443/1 (Aug. 17, 2012).
202. US–Renewable Energy Sector, supra note 2.
203. Id.
204. Request For Consultations By Argentina, Peru—Anti-Dumping And
Countervailing Measures On Biodiesel From Argentina, WTO Doc.
G/ADP/D129/1 (Dec. 5, 2018).
205. See infra sec. V.A.
206. COTTIER ET. AL., supra note 189, at 7.
207. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of the various WTO agreements and
articles at issue in energy disputes, see generally Droege et al. supra note 13.
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category—renewable energy disputes—largely involves the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM Agreement) as well as Article III of the GATT, and the TRIMS Agreement.208 A subsidy exists under the SCM Agreement if there is
a financial contribution by a government or public body, which
confers a benefit which is specific to certain enterprises.209 Subsidies can be applied to facilitate renewable energy investment
and production, but can also provide subsidies for fossil fuel investments and so have important implications for action under
the Paris Agreement.210 These disputes involve not only subsidies but local content requirements which can constitute discriminatory treatment, and may trigger a subsidy dispute. The
SCM does not distinguish between subsidies for renewable energy and non-renewables.211
The second category of biofuels cases involves the Agreement on Agriculture as well as Article VI of the GATT, as biodiesel and ethanol are included in the HS classification system
of agricultural crops.212 The Agreement on Agriculture classifies

208. See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector/Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed in Tariff Program,
WTO Doc. WT/DS412/R (adopted June 5, 2014); Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector/Canada–
Measures Relating to the Feed in Tariff Program WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R
(adopted June 5, 2014); Panel Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar
Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R (adopted Oct. 14, 2016); Appellate Body Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar
Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (adopted Oct. 14, 2016); Panel Report,
US–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc.
WT/DS437/R (adopted Aug. 15, 2019), Appellate Body Report, US–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R
(adopted Aug. 15, 2019); Article 21.5 Panel Report, US–Countervailing Duty
Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/RW (adopted
Aug. 15, 2019).
209. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1869 U.N.T.S.
14, Art. 1.2, 2.1(a),2.2 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
210. Droege et al. supra note 13, at 36. For an analysis of fossil fuel subsidies
generally, see JAKOB SKOVGAARD & HARRO VAN ASSELT, THE POLITICS OF FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES AND THEIR REFORM (CUP 2018). No fossil fuel subsidies
have ever been the subject of a dispute at the WTO. Meyer, supra note 7, at 496.
211. SCM Agreement, supra note 209.
212. See, e.g., Panel Report, EU–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from
Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS443/R (adopted Oct. 26, 2016); Appellate Body Report, EU–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc.
WT/DS443/AB/R (adopted Oct. 26, 2016); Panel Report, EU–Anti-Dumping
Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia, WTO Doc. WT/DS480/R (adopted Feb.
28, 2018).
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biofuels based on whether the base crop is an industrial or agricultural product.213
A. RENEWABLE ENERGY DISPUTES
All the most recent renewable energy disputes have been
unsuccessful. This is largely because in the renewable energy
sector they involved protectionist elements which fell afoul of
WTO rules. In the biofuels cases, even where the country’s domestic policies were WTO-compliant, the opposing side was able
to avoid compliance through the WTO system. The first renewable energy dispute in 2012 involved developed countries on both
sides as both complainants and respondents. The Canada–Renewable Energy/FIT dispute214 involved protectionist policies
being both employed and contested by developed countries. This
case also established important approaches and interpretations
by the Panel and Appellate Body to the SCM Agreement, which
affected later cases in this vein. However, renewable energy disputes quickly evolved to include developing countries as well. In
2014, the US–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China215 was decided by the Appellate Body with recourse to an Article 21.5 Panel decision published in March
2018,216 and in 2016 the India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules was decided by the Appellate
Body.217 In these two disputes, a developing country has been in
213. FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2008, 52 (2008), http://www.fao.org/3/i0100e/i0100e00.htm.
214. See Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, ¶ 1.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted
May 24, 2013) (outlining Japan and the European Union’s problems with the
Panel’s findings related to Canada’s FIT Program). But see Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States-Certain
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc.
WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 7, 2012) (showing that earlier in 2012, China submitted a
request for consultations, but the request never proceeded to a dispute).
215. Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures
on Certain Products from China, ¶ 1.4, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted
Aug. 15, 2019) (describing a dispute in which China was the complainant).
216. Final Panel Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products From China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/RW (Mar. 21, 2018); see
also Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China, United States-Countervailing
Duty Measures on Certain Products From China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/25 (May
4, 2018) (requesting an appeal).
217. Appellate Body Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells
and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (adopted Oct. 14, 2016) (describing a dispute in which India was a respondent).
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both the position of complainant as well as respondent respectively.
Figure 1 below summarizes the renewable energy disputes,
and shows that in every case, the challenging country was successful to some degree. In some instances, Article XX was not
raised as a defense by the responding country. Where India did
raise an Article XX defense against a complainant by the US, it
was not successful.
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Case

Complainant

Respondent

Articles

Defence

Success

Canada–Renewable Energy, FIT

Japan
EU

Canada

GATT
III:4;

No Article XX
defence
used

EU/Japan
successful:
Violation of
III:4;

and

WT/DS412/AB/R

III:8(a);

AB May 6, 2013

SCM
3.1(b)

US–Countervailing
Duty
Measures
on
Certain
Products from China
WT/DS437/AB/R

China

US

SCM
Agreement Article
1.1(b),
2.1(a) and
14(d)

None

China successful218

US

India

GATT
III:4;

GAT
III:8(a);

US successful:

TRIMS
2.1

Article
XX(j) or
XX(d)

Violates
III:4;
not
protected by
III:8(a); Article XX(j) and
(d) not applicable.219

AB Dec. 18 2014
India–Certain
Measures Relating to Solar
Cells and Solar
Modules
WT/DS456/AB/R
AB Sep. 16 2016

No violation
of III:8(a) or
SCM 1.1(b)

218. This appellate body dispute involved solar panels only. Trade remedy
disputes to implement the AB outcome were not as successful for China, Final
Panel Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products
from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/RW (adopted Aug. 15, 2019), and on 4 May
2018 China requested an appeal of this decision in Recourse to Article 21.6 of
the DSU by China, United States-Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain
Products From China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/25 (May 4, 2018).
219. This dispute is also going to a trade remedy phase. Request for the Establishment of a Panel, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/20 (Jan. 29, 2018).
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United
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GATT
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India
successful: US
actions violate III:4.220

Panel Jun. 27
2019
Figure 1 – Renewable Energy Disputes at the WTO221

1. Canada–Renewable Energy/FIT
The first dispute involved a feed-in-tariff by the Government
of Ontario which entered into contractual agreements with producers of solar and wind energy. The feed-in-tariff was constituted by a fixed price per unit of production in order to encourage
participation of new generation facilities to replace the phasing
out of coal-fired plants, as well as to stimulate local investment
in the production of renewable energy equipment.222 Local investment was stimulated through the requirement, in addition
220. The United States has requested an appeal of this dispute. Notification
of an Appeal by the United States, United States – Certain Measures Relating
to the Renewable Energy Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS510/5 (Aug. 16, 2019). Given
the existing stasis at the Appellate Body it is unclear when an appeal will be
heard.
221. A number of disputes have never proceeded beyond the request for consultations stage and therefore have not been covered in detail, such as Request
for Consultations by the United States, China–Measures Concerning Wind
Power Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS419/1 (Jan. 6, 2011) where the US challenged grants given by the Chinese government for use of domestic parts by
Chinese wind power manufacturers in 2011 and China terminated the program,
and Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member
States-Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector,
WTO Doc. WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 7, 2012), a dispute brought by China against domestic content attached to FIT programs in Europe in 2012. The figures of the
disputes summarize only the main aspects and articles involved in the dispute
and broad outcomes.
222. Aaron Cosbey & Petros C. Mavroides, A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the
Subsidies Agreement of the WTO, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 11, 13 (2014) (describing
the fundamental objectives of the FIT Programme); see Henok Birhanu Asmelash, Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Only Renewable Energy Subsidies Are Challenged, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 261, 283 (2015) (noting that
Japan may have initiated the dispute against Canada in response to Canada
signing an agreement to use renewable sources to generate electricity with the
Korean company, a competitor to the Japanese firms Mitsubishi and Sharp).
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to fixed feed-in-tariffs, of a minimum local or domestic content
requirement in the development and construction of solar PV
panels and wind power facilities.223 The EU and Japan sued on
the basis that government support to both electricity generators
(mainly local suppliers) as well as to green technology products
(which can be more easily traded internationally) was discriminatory.224 They were successful as the Panel held that the local
content requirement was deemed to be a violation of Article III
of the GATT.225 The Panel was keen to note the importance of
the electricity sector as the “lifeblood of modern society,” and
that it was not disputing the public goal of enhancing renewable
energy generation, but was focusing instead on the trade distortive elements of the program.226 The case illustrates the tension
between the panel recognizing the policy importance of renewables but that the trade distorting elements of the policy put it in
conflict with trade rules.
However, while the Panel decided that there was not sufficient evidence to establish whether a benefit had been provided
under the SCM Agreement,227 the Appellate Body (AB) took a
different approach, and defined the relevant product market for
the SCM Agreement as separate for conventional energy versus
renewable energy.228 This was justified by the AB on the basis
that the renewable energy market, emphasizing supply-side factors such as operating costs, upfront costs, and intermittency,
was constructed entirely through government regulation instead

223. Cosbey & Mavroides, supra note 222, at 13–14.
224. Espa & Durán, supra note 21, at 631; see Patrice Bougette & Christophe
Charlier, Renewable Energy, Subsidies, and the WTO: Where Has the ‘Green’
Gone?, 51 ENERGY ECON. 407, 411 (2015) (noting that subsidies to renewable
energy producers also have “pass through” effects which benefit power generation equipment producers).
225. Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector/Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed in Tariff Program, ¶ 7.167,
WTO Doc. WT/DS412/R (adopted June 5, 2014).
226. Id. at ¶ 7.7–7.10 (describing the issues and factual background involved
in the dispute).
227. Id. at ¶ 7.327 (stating that “a comparison between the relevant rates of
return” and “the relevant average cost of capital” could be a useful analysis, but
additional questions and facts must be addressed to proceed).
228. Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector/Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed in Tariff Program,
¶ 5.176–5.185, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted June 5, 2014).
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of market forces.229 The AB was clear in its support for the public
policy goals involved, stating:
Governments intervene by reducing reliance on fossil energy resources
and promoting the generation of electricity from renewable energy resources to ensure sustainability of electricity markets in the long term.
Fossil energy resources are exhaustible, and thus fossil energy needs
to be replaced progressively if electricity supply is to be guaranteed in
the long term.230

In subsequent energy cases, no such comments regarding
public policy interventions in the transition away from fossil
fuels, or in fact climate change, are mentioned by the Panel or
the AB again.231 At the time, the AB’s approach supporting the
renewable energy policy was heavily criticized as “legal acrobatics” to avoid finding that a scheme aimed at a public good is an
inconsistent subsidy and for providing the wrong incentive to
states to develop “industrial policy unlimited.”232
As a result of this dispute, critics have called for the SCM
Agreement to be renegotiated in order to provide wider policy
space for countries to implement public goods of mitigation of
climate change,233 and to expressly apply environmental defenses under Article XX directly to the SCM Agreement.234 These
suggested amendments involve legislative fixes and should be
carried out in conjunction with the jurisprudential approaches
suggested here. More progressive interpretations of Article XX
could still allow for disputes under the SCM Agreement against
domestic subsidies, and so both legislative and jurisprudential
adjustments are needed.

229. Id.
230. Id. at ¶5.186.
231. But see Brazil–Taxation supra note 91, at ⁋ 7.882 (holding that the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions fall within GATT 1994’s environmental exceptions).
232. Cosbey & Mavroidis, supra note 222, at 12; see also Rajib Pal, Has the
Appellate Body’s Decision in Canada-Renewable Energy/Canada-Feed-in Tariff
Opened the Door for Production Subsidies?, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 125 (2014); Rolf
H. Weber & Rika Koch, International Trade Law Challenges by Subsidies for
Renewable Energy, 49 J. WORLD TRADE 757, 779 (2015); Luca Rubini, The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly: Lessons on Methodology in Legal Analysis from the Recent WTO Litigation on Renewable Energy Subsidies, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 895
(2014). But cf. ESPA & DURÁN, supra note 21, at 635 (arguing that the case did
not have a chilling effect on the use of FIT programs globally and FIT programs
are unlikely to be disputed by WTO members in the future).
233. Cosbey & Mavroides, supra note 222, at 28–34.
234. Id. at 34–35.

46

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 22:1

After the decision, the Canadian Government did reduce,
but did not eliminate, the local content requirement.235 This reluctance to eliminate local content requirements reflects a broad
consensus among countries that renewable energy support is a
legitimate form of industrial policy making.236 While this policy
has climate change mitigation and energy security aims, it also
has “job creation and domestic technological progress” objectives.237 The following two sets of disputes involve developing
countries, but have attracted much less scholarly attention than
the Canada–Renewable Energy/FIT dispute.
2. US–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products
from China
In 2007, US-based firms, including the US Wind Tower
Trade Coalition and the Steelworkers Association, petitioned the
United States Trade Representative to initiate an anti-dumping
and countervailing duty investigation against imports from
China.238 From 1996–2005, foreign companies dominated 75% of
the Chinese domestic wind turbine market.239 However, by 2009
China had become the world’s top installer of wind, exceeding
the US.240 As a result, China began exporting wind turbines to
the US, which the US saw as draining investment in this technology from the US to China.241 The US Department of
235. Steve Charnovitz & Carolyn Fischer, Canada-Renewable Energy: Implications for WTO Law on Green and Not-So-Green Subsidies, 14 J. WORLD
TRADE 177, 181 (2015).
236. Id. at 186.
237. Kati Kulovesi, International Trade Disputes on Renewable Energy:
Testing Ground for the Mutual Supportiveness of WTO Law and Climate
Change Law, 23 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY. & INT’L ENV’T L. 342, 343 (2014).
238. Henok Birhanu Asmelash, Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Only Renewable Energy Subsidies Are Challenged, 18 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 261, 282–83 (2015).
239. Seung-Youn Oh, How China Outsmarts WTO Rulings in the Wind Industry, 55 ASIAN SURV. 1116, 1120 (2015).
240. Kenina Lee, Note, An Inherent Conflict Between WTO Law and a Sustainable Future? Evaluating the Consistency of Canadian and Chinese Renewable Energy Policies with WTO Trade Law, 24 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 57, 83
(2011); See also Oh, supra note 239, at 1117–19 (noting that China achieved
this global dominance through a combination of integrated industrial policies
in both demand and supply side markets, and its motivations for doing so were
a mix of wanting to diversify energy resources, mitigation of environmental issues and to encourage industrial upgrades).
241. See Lee supra note 240 at 83 (discussing how in 2011 the US challenged
grants given by the Chinese government for use of domestic parts by Chinese
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Commerce applied seventeen countervailing duty investigations
during 2007–2012 which included solar panels, wind towers,
steel cylinders and steel sinks, on the basis that twelve Chinese
State Owned Enterprises were public bodies under the SCM
Agreement, and had applied subsidies inconsistent with the
SCM Agreement.242 The SCM Agreement prohibits certain subsidies if provided by “public bod[ies]” under Article 1.1(a)(1) (being bodies vested with, and exercising, authority to perform governmental functions).243 The main issue in this case was
whether the Chinese State Owned Enterprises were “public bodies.”244 On most issues (except wind towers and solar panels) the
Panel decided the US acted inconsistently with the SCM Agreement in determining that ownership in and of itself was sufficient to deem a state owned enterprise a public body under Article 1.1(a)(i) of the SCM Agreement.245 At the AB level, only solar
panels were at issue. At issue was whether a benefit was provided under Article 14 of the SCM Agreement. The AB found
that the US explanation for rejecting in-country prices in its
benchmark analysis of solar panels to determine whether a benefit was granted to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises was inconsistent with its obligations under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement.246 While successful at the AB level, China has not yet been
able to secure compliance by the US with the AB’s ruling.247

wind power manufacturers and brought a request for consultations in the
China–Wind dispute. However, instead of proceeding to a dispute, China terminated the program).
242. Appellate Body Report, US–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain
Products from China, ¶ 1.2, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Dec. 18, 2014).
243. SCM Agreement, supra note 209, art. 1.1(a)(1).
244. US–Countervailing Duty Measures, supra note 242, at ⁋1.7.
245. Id., at ⁋1.7.
246. Id. at ⁋4.79, (concluding that “the Panel’s analysis and reasoning is not
sufficient to support a conclusion that the USDOC properly rejected in-country
prices in China” in the challenged investigations).
247. Under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, the arbitrator determined that fifteen
months was adequate for the US to implement the ruling, but subsequently in
November 2016 China sought recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings, claiming the
US had not yet implemented the ruling. The panel decision on Article 21.5 was
published on March 21, 2018, with mixed results for China. The appeal involved
countervailing duties imposed on a number of goods including pressure pipes,
lead pipes, and solar panels, but not wind towers. China was not successful in
establishing a violation of Article 1.1(a)(1) by the US on the basis of an “as applied” claim with respect to solar panels but was successful in establishing a
violation by the US of Articles 1.1(b), 2.1(c), and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement
and 2.1(c) on solar panel administrative reviews under the SCM Agreement.

48

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 22:1

3. India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar
Modules
The US-India dispute is one in which India did raise Article
XX as a defense, but was not successful. India’s use of Article
XX, however, was not ideal and in particular did not connect its
existing public health crisis of air pollution to its national solar
energy program. In this case, the US sued India on the basis of
India’s national solar panel initiative. In 2010, India launched
its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, with the objective
of establishing India as a global leader in solar energy, as well
as creating conditions for the diffusion of solar energy across the
country.248 The program aimed to generate 100,000 MW of gridconnected solar power by 2022, and to achieve rapid and largescale capital investment in solar energy, encourage technical innovation, and phased indigenization.249 The Twelfth Five-Year
Plan of 2011 recognized that climate change mitigation policies
would have differential impacts on national development objectives such as job creation, competitiveness, and industrial
growth, as well as improved access to energy.250
Domestic climate policy in India (as elsewhere) is shaped by
national and sub-national development interests.251 The National Solar Mission established in 2010 clearly stated national
ambitions as both promoting ecological and sustainable growth
while addressing the nation’s energy security challenge.252
These dual aims were to be achieved through the creation of conditions to enable a “rapid scale-up of capacity and technical innovation to drive down costs” of solar energy.253 The policy took
See Panel Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain
Products from China: Recourse to Article 21.5, ¶¶ 7.142, 7.224, 7.293, WTO Doc.
WT/DS437/RW (adopted Mar. 21, 2018).
248. See Panel Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and
Solar Modules ¶ 7.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R (adopted Feb. 24, 2016) (citing
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Resolution, No.5/14/2008-P&C (Issued
Jan. 11, 2010), http://164.100.94.214/resolution) (explaining the goals of India’s
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission).
249. Id.
250. Aaron Alteridge et al., Climate Policy in India: What Shapes International, National and State Policy?, 41 AMBIO 68, 72 (2012) (acknowledging the
various impacts on various aspects of India’s development objectives).
251. Id. at 74.
252. Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, 1 https://www.seci.co.in/upload/static/files/mission_document_JNNSM(1).pdf (establishing India’s national ambitions as motivation for its solar power initiative).
253. Id. at 1–2.
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a phased approach, with phase two between 2013–2017 focused
on “aggressively ramp[ing] up” capacity “to create conditions for
scaled up and competitive solar energy penetration [across] the
country.”254 The policy specifically targeted electrification programs in remote villages as well as supporting small and medium sized enterprises in manufacturing parts.255 In addition,
India’s enormous growth in the past few decades is straining its
existing energy resources, with 80% of the oil in the country
sourced from imports.256 Therefore, energy security was also a
major aim of the domestic program.257 Curiously, improvement
in air pollution and health did not form part of the national strategic plan.
In order to achieve the aims of the program, the government
would enter into long-term power purchase agreements with solar power developers, providing a guaranteed rate for twentyfive years from the government.258 During Phase I of the program, it was mandatory for all generators to use crystalline silicon solar modules manufactured in India, constituting a local
content requirement.259 The US brought a dispute against India
for violation of Article III:4 of the GATT for the local content requirement and Article 2.1 of TRIMS (which similarly requires
national treatment in the implementation of a trade related investment measure).260 The US did not invoke the SCM Agreement, perhaps due to the Canada–Renewable Energy/FIT decision. Following the Canada–Renewable Energy/FIT decision,
the Panel found the local content requirement violated both Article III:4 of the GATT as well as Article 2.1 of TRIMS.261
Unlike Canada, however, India ran several defenses under
Article III:8(a) for government policies, and also under Articles
XX(j) and (d). Article XX(j) protects measures essential to the
acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short
254. Id. at 3.
255. Id. at 5.
256. MINISTRY OF NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR
NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR FOR PERIOD 2011-2017 7 (Issued February 2011), https://www.ctc-n.org/sites/www.ctc-n.org/files/resources/strategic_plan_mnre_2011_17.pdf.
257. Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, supra note 252, at 1-2.
258. Id. at 8.
259. Panel Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, ¶ 7.8, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R (adopted Feb. 24, 2016).
260. Id. at ⁋1.1.
261. Id. at ¶8.2.
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supply.262 Article XX(d) protects measures necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Agreement.263 Curiously, India did
not attempt to apply the defenses of Articles XX(b) for health
grounds on the basis of reduced air pollution in the transition to
renewable energy, or XX(g) for the protection of the atmosphere
as an exhaustible natural resource due to climate change,264 and
therefore an opportunity was missed for renewable energy deployment in the context of climate change to be examined by the
Panel and AB. Instead, India couched defenses around energy
security and energy access needs and regulatory climate requirements; that under XX(j) domestically manufactured solar cells
and modules could help to meet increasing domestic energy demand and supplement shortage of supplies of foreign solar cells,
and that under XX(d) the solar program was required for India
to comply with a number of both international treaties (including the UNFCCC) and domestic instruments to mitigate climate
change and transition to renewable energy.265 India may have
focused on Article XX(j) and not on XX(b) due to the emphasis in
its national policy on energy security, and its lack of emphasis
in domestic policy on the impacts of climate change on health.
India was not successful on either count. In relation to XX(j),
both the Panel and AB held that there was no objective assessment of an existing deficiency of renewable energy in India, and
while there was some risk of disruption of supply in affordable
foreign solar cells, India had not identified actual disruptions in
supply, and therefore could not employ the XX(j) defense.266 In
relation to Article XX(d), India cited the preambular reference to
sustainable development in the WTO Agreement, the UNFCCC,
the Rio Declaration, and the UNGA Resolution 2012 adopting

262. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(j).
263. Id. art. XX(d).
264. BODANSKY ET AL. supra note 45 (arguing that based on the US–Gasoline and the Shrimp/Turtle disputes, the global climate would constitute an
exhaustible natural resource and therefore bring climate change mitigation policies within the ambit of Article XX(g)).
265. India–Solar, supra note 259, at ¶7.189–191 (summarizing India’s arguments for why the domestic content requirements (DCRs) imposed under India’s
Jawaharial Nehru National Solar Mission are essential and fall within the Article XX(d) and XX(j) exceptions of the GATT 1994).
266. See id. at ¶¶ 7.225–7.262 (explaining why India’s arguments are insufficient to qualify for the Article XX(j) exception of the GATT 1994).
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the Rio +20 Declaration. For example, the preamble to the WTO
Agreement states WTO members recognize that
“their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods
and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources
in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs
and concerns at different levels of economic development.”267

The Panel held that these instruments did not have direct
effect in India and therefore did not fall under the remit of Article XX(d), and India’s laws on renewable energy were more akin
to policy documents than regulations.268
On appeal, the AB did note, in relation to Article XX(j), that
developing countries may be more vulnerable to disruptions in
supply, and that an analysis of whether a product is in short
supply must be done on a case by case basis, taking into account
holistic factors.269 However, while the AB could agree that an
increase in domestic capacity may lead to an increase in total
quantity of available supply of renewable energy, it did not agree
that a decrease in domestic capacity would necessarily produce
a foreign shortfall.270 In relation to Article XX(d), the AB held
that the instruments pointed out by India did not contain the
requisite degree of normativity, specificity and enforceability.271
The domestic national plans and policies on energy were too
“hortatory, aspirational, declaratory,” and “descriptive” to qualify for protection under Article XX(d).272

267. WTO Agreement, supra note 35.
268. See id. at ¶¶ 7.298–7.339 (explaining why India’s arguments are insufficient to qualify for the Article XX(d) exception of the GATT 1994).
269. See Appellate Body Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar
Cells and Solar Modules, ¶ 5.74, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (adopted Oct. 14,
2016) (explaining how the Appellate Body both agrees and disagrees with elements of India’s Article XX(j) argument).
270. Id.
271. See id. at ¶¶ 5.104–5.137 (discussing the legal standard under Article
XX(j) of the GATT 1994 and whether the Panel erred in its assessment of the
domestic instruments identified by India).
272. See id. at ¶ 5.133 (stating that the Appellate Body fails to see how the
domestic instruments India has identified could be interpreted as a “rule”
within the context of Article XX(d)).
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4. United States–Certain Measures Relating to Renewable
Energy
In September 2018, India sued the US in relation to renewable energy programs in a number of US states. India claimed
these programs included a number of discriminatory elements,
including domestic content and labor requirements as well as
other incentives provided by California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, and Minnesota.273 These
various regulations offered incentives for renewable energy
equipment or electricity provided from equipment or components made in the relevant state or employing a certain percentage of residents of that state. For example, the California SelfGeneration Incentive Program provided incentives for installation of new qualifying technologies which would meet the electric
energy needs of a new facility.274 An added incentive payment of
20% would be provided to any retail electric or gas distribution
customer for installation of eligible distributed resources from a
California supplier or manufacturer.275 The Delaware Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards Act required that electricity suppliers and municipal electric companies sell a certain percentage
of their electricity using eligible energy resources including solar
energy.276 This was tracked using renewable and solar energy
credits tradeable in an electronic market system.277 An additional 10% credit was provided to retail electricity suppliers for
meeting the renewable energy portfolio standards for solar or
wind energy from installations sited in Delaware, provided a
minimum of 50% of the renewable equipment used was manufactured in Delaware or from a facility constructed or staffed
with a minimum of 75% of in-state workforce.278 The disputed
policies of Montana concerned biodiesel and ethanol, which enjoyed tax incentives if the fuel or feedstock for those fuels were
produced in the state concerned.279 India claimed that several
regulations in these regulations treated imported like products
less favorably than domestic products and therefore violated

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

US–Renewable Energy, supra note 2.
Id. at ¶ 2.14.
See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 379.6(j) (West 2019).
US–Renewable Energy, supra note 2, at ¶2.51.
Id.
Id at ¶ 2.52.
Id. at ¶2.20.
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Article III:4 of GATT as well as several articles of the TRIMS
and SCM Agreement.
The Panel found that all of these measures violated Article
III:4 by impacting the conditions of competition between domestic and imported products, even though some of these incentives
payments had never been used.280 It did not matter to the Panel
that no trade effects or proof that the measures had affected
sourcing decisions of private firms had been provided.281 The
United States did not attempt to rely on any Article XX defenses
in this dispute, and has appealed the decision.282 At the moment,
given the backlog of cases pending appeal, the dispute is unlikely
to be resolved for some time.283
B. BIOFUELS DISPUTES
The second category of cases involves the export of biofuels.
Biofuels are a potential alternative to fossil fuels, particularly in
the transportation sector.284 They constitute both biodiesel for
use primarily in diesel engines and made from ethanol or alcohol
from fermented plant starches, and bioethanol for use in petrol
engines and made from vegetable oil or animal fats.285 The environmental sustainability of biofuels has been debated, particularly first generation biofuels, as their production can lead to

280. Id. at ¶8.4.
281. Id. at ¶ 7.245 (stating that trade effects or proof of impact on sourcing
decisions of private firms may be involved in an assessment under Article III:4
of the GATT 1994, but they are not required).
282. Notification of an Appeal by the United States, United States–Certain
Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS510/5
(Aug. 16, 2019).
283. See Lehne, supra note 14, at 133 (describing how it would be almost
impossible for the Appellate Body to, among other things, submit its reports
within the 90-day deadline due to the backlog of cases created by the US blockage of Appellate Body member appointments).
284. Harri Kalimo, Filip Sedefor & Max S. Janson, Market Definition as
Value Reconciliation: The Case of Renewable Energy Promotion Under the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 17 INT’L ENV’T AGREEMENTS 427, 430 (2017).
285. Id. at 434; Elisa Ruozzi, China and Biofuels: Legal and Policy Issues in
the Framework of the WTO System, 6 CHINA-EU L. J. 33, 33–34 (2016) (discussing that biofuels are liquid fuels based on biomass which can vary in source and
chemical structure. First generation biofuels are largely constituted by sugarcane ethanol, starch-based or corn-based ethanol, biodiesel from pure plant oil
and some niche biofuels such as biogas. Second generation biofuels are made
from cellulose, hemicellulose or lignin, for example cellulose ethanol or algaebased biofuels (the latter is also known as a third generation biofuel)).
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direct and indirect land-use change, remove arable land for food
production, and provide low wages and insecure employment.286
Developing countries have been both active and successful
in law in biofuels disputes. Argentina is a major exporter of biofuels based on raw materials of soybeans, and Indonesia based
on palm oil. Due to labor costs, geography and climate, developing countries have natural cost advantages in the production of
biofuels.287 Major exporters of biofuels include Brazil, Argentina,
Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Saudi Arabia, Costa Rica, Jamaica,
India, Korea, and Nigeria.288 Developed countries therefore need
a high rate of subsidization in order to protect their industries
from lower-cost imports from tropical regions.289 Due to the nature of biofuels as crops, they fall under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), but fall under two different categories in the HS
classification system (bioethanol under HS Chapter 22 and biodiesel under HS Chapter 38) based on their chemical composition.290 Biodiesel is also classed as an industrial good, subject to
the SCM Agreement.291
Developing countries have employed differential export tariffs in order to protect their domestic biofuel industries. They
have taxed the export of raw materials used in the development
of biofuels at a higher rate than the export of processed biofuels.292 This allows the value of the raw materials to be reduced
on the domestic market, making them cheaper for purchase by
domestic producers, and therefore making domestically
286. Claudia Franziska Bruhwiler & Heinz Hauser, Biofuels and WTO Disciplines, 63 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 7, 7–8 (2008); Gretchen Gordon, The Global
Free Market in Biofuels, 51 DEV. 481, 481–82 (2008).
287. Bruhwiler & Hauser, supra note 286, at 10.
288. Id. at 9; Doaa Abden Motael, The Biofuels Landscape: Is There a Role
for the WTO? 42 J. WORLD TRADE 61, 69 (2008).
289. Bruhwiler & Hauser, supra note 286, at 16; see also Press Conference,
United Nations, Press Conference Launching International Biofuels Forum
(Mar. 2, 2007), http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/070302_Biofuels.doc.htm
(establishing the International Biofuels Forum under the auspices of the UN,
as a joint project with Brazil, the US, EU, China, India, and South Africa as a
mechanism to co-ordinate and share information between both well established
and less well established players on the international biofuels scene).
290. Biofuels can be either biodiesel from foodstocks such as corn, or
biodiesel from lipids such as animal fats. Bruhwiler & Hauser, supra note 286,
at 19.
291. Sarah L. Stattman & Aarti Gupta, Negotiating Authority in Global
Biofuel Governance: Brazil and the EU in the WTO, 15 GLOB. ENV’T. POL. 41,
51 (2015).
292. Ruozzi, supra note 285, at 48.
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processed biofuels more competitive on the international markets,293 allowing domestic producers to scale the value chain and
bolster domestic biofuel industries. In response to these strategies, the EU added anti-dumping duties under the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) on to imports of biofuels from developing
countries, leading to two sets of disputes brought by Argentina
and Indonesia, both acting as complainants.
Figure 2 illustrates that both Argentina and Indonesia were
successful in defending their domestic policies on biofuels by imposing export restraints. Despite their success, each country has
struggled to have the decision implemented, and developed
countries continue to impose some level of protectionist policy on
import of biofuels from abroad.

293. Id.
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Argentina

EU

ADA

None

Argentina;

Articles
2.2 and
2.2.1.1

Dumping
Measures on
Biodiesel
from Argentina
WT/DS473/
AB/RAB
Oct. 6, 2016

EU–AntiDumping
Measures on
Biodiesel
from Indonesia
WT/DS480/
R

Indonesia

EU

ADA

EU had violated
Article
2.2.1.1 and Article 2.2 by using
international
reference price
failing to take
into
account
records kept by
domestic producers
None

Articles
2.2 and
2.2.1.1
and Articles
3.1 and
3.2

Indonesia; EU
had
violated
ADA
Agreement
Article
2.2.1.1 and 3.1
and 3.2

Panel Jan.
25, 2018

Figure 2 – Biofuels Disputes at the WTO294

294. There have been a number of other disputes regarding EU sustainability criteria imposed on imports of biofuels, which Brazil addressed through diplomacy, and also on domestic content requirements in Spain. Argentina requested consultations with the EU on both of these issues, but they never
proceeded to a dispute and so have not been included here. See Request for Consultations by the European Union and a Member State—Certain Measures Concerning the Importation of Biodiesels, WTO Doc. WT/DS443/1 (Aug. 23, 2012);
Request for Consultations by the European Union and Certain Member
States—Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and
Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS459/1 23 (May
15, 2013).
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1. EU–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina
Argentina brought a dispute against the EU regarding antidumping duties imposed on biodiesel from Argentina.295 Antidumping duties are import duties imposed by a country that believes another country has exported their goods to them at
cheaper than market rates. This behavior is regulated by the
Anti-Dumping Agreement under the WTO (ADA).296 The Agreement regulates how a domestic investigating authority, which
recommended the level of anti-dumping duties to impose, can
calculate the level of those import duties. Article 2.2 of the ADA
Agreement requires an investigating authority use either the
cost of production in the country of origin (plus a reasonable
amount for administration, selling, etc.) or the costs normally
calculated based on records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation.297 The EU argued that it added import duties
based on the international reference price for what domestic Argentinian biofuels producers should have paid for domestic raw
material inputs by adding to the price of soybeans the direct export taxes imposed by Argentina in order to construct the normal
value for dumping calculations.298 Argentina argued that this
approach violated Article 2.2.1.1 and 2.5 of the ADA Agreement
which required the EU to determine the normal value based on
the domestic producer’s records in the country of origin, and
whether they reasonably reflect the costs of production actually
incurred by the producers.299 The Panel and AB agreed with Argentina, deciding that as a general principle the actual data of
producers in the country of origin was to be preferred in constructing the normal value.300 In addition, the EU had failed to
calculate costs correctly on the basis of the records kept by domestic producers.301

295. Request for Consultations by Argentina, Anti-Dumping Measures on
Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/1 (Dec. 19, 2013).
296. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter ADA Agreement].
297. Id. art. 2.2.
298. Panel Report, European Union–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel
from Argentina, ¶ 7.180–82, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/R (Mar. 29, 2016).
299. Id. at ¶ 7.81.
300. Id. at ¶ 7.231.
301. See id. ¶¶ 7.236-7.249.
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2. EU–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia
The subsequent case, decided in 2018, involved a dispute
brought by Indonesia against similar practices by the EU on biodiesel implemented in 2013 by the EU as a result of complaints
by the European Biodiesel Board.302 Similar to Argentina, Indonesia claimed the EU had not calculated the costs of production
of biodiesel based on records of domestic producers in constructing the normal value for Indonesian producers, claiming the set
of circumstances facing Indonesia was “essentially identical” to
those successfully raised by Argentina.303 The EU claimed that
differential export tariffs depressed the price of soybeans and
soybean oil from Argentina, as well as crude palm oil (CPO) from
Indonesia, distorting the cost of biodiesel producers.304 Indonesia
added an export tax of 40% on the raw material for CPO, palm
fruit.305 The EU disregarded the actual costs of raw materials as
recorded by producers in Indonesia, and instead used the reference price for CPO as published by Indonesian authorities which
averaged published international prices from three sources
(costs, insurance, and freight from Rotterdam, Malaysia, and Indonesia).306 The Panel held this approach violated Article 2.2.1.1
of the ADA which required that costs normally be calculated on
the basis of records kept by exporters or producers under investigation, provided their records are in accordance with GAAP.307
It should be noted that the palm oil industry in Indonesia in particular has been highly criticized for its contributions to deforestation, and therefore although a renewable energy, its climate
benefits are highly questionable.308
Despite WTO “wins” in disputes, unilateral action by the
United States and Peru could render the Argentinian biofuels
industry nonviable.309 Given these developments, protectionist
302. Panel Report, European Union Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel
from Indonesia, WTO Doc. WT/DS480/R (Feb. 28, 2018).
303. Id. at ¶ 7.12.
304. Id. at ¶ 7.13.
305. See id. ¶ 7.14 (“The export for palm fruit was set at a rate of 40%.”).
306. Id. ¶ 7.15.
307. Id. at ¶ 7.34.
308. Abrahm Lustgarten, Palm Oil Was Supposed to Help Save the Planet.
Instead It Unleashed a Catastrophe, NEW YORK TIMES MAG., (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/magazine/palm-oil-borneo-climate-catastrophe.html; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 17,
at 269.
309. Meyer, supra note 7, at 547–48.
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disputes in the biofuels arena may continue for some time, and
differential export tariffs may in reality not provide a benefit to
developing countries given the domestic actions of the EU and
US, until fresh disputes have made their way through the
DSM.310 This means that biofuel exporting countries may not
benefit from a decline in the DSM, and are more economically
vulnerable to unilateral trade measures. Where biofuels do not
have beneficial climate impacts, this strategic compliance, this
time largely by developed countries, may not be all bad for the
climate.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
The nature of environmental disputes at the WTO and the
role of developing countries is shifting. While the older disputes
which led to progressive interpretation of Article XX provisions
were primarily natural resource and environmental disputes,
energy disputes are now replacing these older disputes. Wu and
Salzman note that the “classic” environmental disputes of the
1990s, in which developing countries brought disputes against
“protectionist” environmental measures implemented by developed countries, have now given way to disputes brought primarily by developed countries against new “green” industrial policy

310. There are two other categories of raw materials cases which are more
indirectly related to energy and so are not covered in this paper. These are the
disputes between mainly the US and China on raw materials and rare earth
minerals. These cases turned on the interpretation of the provisions of the Accession Protocol of China, the main respondent in these disputes, as well as
providing arguendo interpretations of Article XX of the GATT regarding export
restriction. They involve raw materials and minerals such as gallium, lithium,
nickel, antimony, indium lanthanum, magnesium, and tin which are used in
rechargeable batteries. See Panel Report, China–Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/R (adopted July 5,
2011); Appellate Body Report, China–Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/AB/1 (adopted Jan. 30, 2012);
Panel Report, China–Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/R (adopted May 20, 2015); Appellate Body Report, China–Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten and Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/AB/R (adopted May 20,
2015). The general outcome of these disputes was that China was not able to
rely on Article XX due to a restrictive interpretation of its Accession Protocol.
However, even if China were allowed to rely on Article XX in this dispute, those
efforts would have been unsuccessful given the arguendo interpretations of Article XX.
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measures implemented by developing countries.311 Developing
countries were successful in all of their dispute efforts in these
older “classic” environmental disputes, but have experienced
mixed and largely negative outcomes in the newer energy disputes. Dubbed the “next generation” of trade and environmental
conflicts, Wu and Salzman anticipate these new types of disputes, based on green industrial policy, will dominate the trade
and environment discourse for decades to come,312 and so ultimately some synergy between the trade and climate change regime is needed.
The interface between trade and climate change is at the
heart of legal developments in energy law,313 and this relationship, along with these particular disputes, are understudied.
Left unchecked, governance deficiencies in the trade-climate
nexus could “constrain the potential for trade to expand clean
energy technologies worldwide,”314 which would lead to negative
consequences for the climate. Poor outcomes in these energy disputes and the current approach of the DSM to Article XX means
the WTO may not be an appropriate forum to adjudicate energy
disputes in the context of climate change. A move away from
multilateralism in the climate context may not be a bad thing in
the short term. In the longer term, a better synergy between the
WTO and the goals of the Paris Agreement will be needed in order to avoid catastrophic climate change and ensure a more cohesive global strategy to increase the diffusion of renewable energy.
The regime complex of climate change means that several
narrow regimes exist which concern climate change, without a
clear hierarchy among the regimes.315 While regime complexes

311. See Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 404 (listing the “classic” trio environmental disputes as Tuna/Dolphin, Shrimp/Tuna, and US–Gasoline,
deeming cases such as EC–Biotech and Brazil–Tyres to be more concerned with
health than environmental issues).
312. Id.; see also YANOVICH, supra note 186, at 1.
313. See Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 238 (discussing ways to address the “perennial challenge” of “[a]chieving a better balance of environmental issues within the economic agenda and the ecological and economic governance of natural resources . . .”).
314. Dent, supra note 12, at 729.
315. Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate
Change, 9 PERSP. ON POLS., 7, 8 (2011) (“Regime Complexes are marked by connections between the specific and narrow regimes but the absence of an overall
architecture or hierarchy that structures the whole set.”).
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can have dysfunctional tendencies, there may exist “flexibility
across issues, and adaptability over time.”316 Adopting more climate-friendly interpretations of Article XX is not outside the
bounds of the history of the DSM. Facing significant criticism in
the 1990s, the DSM developed more flexible interpretations of
Article XX(b) and XX(g) that could better cater for domestic policy priorities such as health and the environment.317 These are
now considered valuable policy norms in the WTO, and climate
change and related clean energy policies should benefit from
similar treatment.
Conversely, not adopting a more generous approach to priorities such as climate change and cleaner energy, would put the
WTO in conflict with the Paris Agreement and later agreements’
expectations that countries progressively ratchet up their ambition over time in nationally determined contributions. In the absence of WTO legislative responses on energy, the inability of the
DSM to recognize and prioritize climate change and sustainable
developmental aims is likely to further erode confidence in the
WTO system, particularly on the part of developing countries
and especially emerging economies, and leave all parties vulnerable to evasive and non-compliant behavior, as well as trade
remedies. This may have negative consequences both for climate
change mitigation as well as for the development trajectories of
developing countries and multilateralism in the longer term.
The flexibility and adaptability of the DSM has been identified as one way for the WTO to navigate through its current impasse of the Doha Round,318 and could also be a method to forge
a more compatible relationship between trade and climate
change. Relying on the “generative quality”319 of the DSM, this
paper suggests two complementary approaches which could be
adopted to smooth the conflict between green industrial policy
making in the energy area and existing WTO jurisprudence.
A number of contextual interpretations of WTO law and lessons can be gleaned from these disputes. Most importantly, energy disputes are escalating at the WTO, despite its declining
316. Id. at 15.
317. See discussion supra Part I(A)–(C).
318. See Klasen, supra note 47 at 68–69, 73–75 (discussing the Doha Round’s
“immense difficulties” as a key example of gridlock in international trade, and
later identifying the DSM as “one of the pathways through gridlock . . . [as an]
autonomous international institution . . . able to adapt to shifting interests”).
319. Id. at 74.
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prominence as a multilateral institution and attempts to paralyze the DSM by the United States. While there may be a “pause”
in disputes in the short term, if the WTO and DSM are reinvigorated, energy disputes are likely to continue. There is an increasing diversity of complainants and respondents in these disputes, and now both developed and developing countries’ policies
are in play, with emerging economies now suing developed and
developing countries over their domestic policy making.
There is a trend of unsuccessful employment of Article XX
by developing countries, illustrating that Article XX tends to
protect conservation-only policies.320 Therefore, green industrial
policy which is tinged with both environmental and infant-industry or other domestic protection elements is likely to be unsuccessful, particularly under Article XX, unless empirical evidence linking protectionist measures to emissions reductions is
provided.321 Strategic compliance by developing countries as a
result may mean that they will be more able to implement domestic protectionist policies around energy. Provided these policies are well designed and implemented and focus on increased
manufacture and diffusion of renewable energy, this may not be
all bad for the climate in the short term.
In the short term, a strategic compliance approach may not
be entirely negative if it provides policy space for countries to
implement urgent and progressive climate action by fostering
the manufacture and diffusion of renewable energy technology.
However, in the longer term, a more synergistic relationship between the WTO and the Paris Agreement should be found. In
particular for developing countries which seek to export renewable energy, multilateral disputes at the DSM can result in suspensions of concessions through the trade remedy function
which can negatively affect other areas of their economy. Unilateral remedies can also be harmful where an importing country
identifies a material injury as a result of another country’s domestic measures in accordance with the Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties Agreement.322 In fact, the bulk of trade

320. See, e.g., supra Part V.A.3 (discussing the India–Solar dispute).
321. Cf. Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 88, at ¶ 145 (emphasizing the
importance of “a genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective
pursued and the measure at issue”).
322. Wu and Salzman highlight the concern regarding unilateral measures
by countries. Supra note 137. Espa and Durán criticize the ability of a unilateral
determination of material injury and the ability of governments to balance
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remedies against renewable energy policies are occurring at the
unilateral level.323 Unilateral measures can also increase the
cost of renewables internationally, and can be particularly problematic for emerging economies that export renewable technology.324 Despite these negative effects, unilateral actions do not
result in direct trade remedies against a subsidizing country,
and still allow for increased domestic production and diffusion,
as well as export to other countries which have not implemented
unilateral measures.
The picture looks slightly different in the biofuels disputes
where developing countries were successful in the DSM, but
their legal successes are being undermined by convenient compliance or evasion by developed countries.325 Developing countries are being denied reliance on comparative advantages in
natural resources, and also are not able to defend their development trajectories within the WTO system. However, as the climate benefits of biofuels can be questionable, particularly those
based on palm oil,326 unilateral measures adopted may not be as
negative for the climate as the measures adopted in relation to
solar and wind technology. These unilateral biofuels measures
may stymie the growth of these industries and therefore consequentially slow deforestation rates. Overall, however, strategic
or convenient compliance strategies by developing countries are
likely to continue as countries carve out green industrial policy
space by maneuvering around WTO rules and dispute outcomes
where that is financially feasible.

negative trade-distortive policies against positive climate mitigation effects particularly when their own domestic industries may be suffering as a result, although they point to the EU Council dispute as to whether countervailing duties
on the import of renewable technology should be terminated due to the Union
interest in maintaining affordable international prices for renewables and the
EU’s own climate policies. Espa & Durán, supra note 21, at 642; Council and
EP Regulation 2016/1037, OJ 2016 L176/55, Article 31 (June 8, 2016).
323. Espa & Durán, supra note 21, at 631.
324. For example, decreased subsidy support in China for renewables and
the transition to market-based approaches has been linked to the high cost of
public subsidies but also economic uncertainty due to trade conflicts with the
United States. Michael Standaert, Why China’s Renewable Energy Transition
is Losing Momentum, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/why-chinas-renewable-energy-transition-is-losing-momentum.
325. See supra, Part V.B.2.
326. See Lustgarten, supra note 308.
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Successful climate change mitigation strategies should arguably support developing countries’ economic and social development needs,327 and so trade policy should work in tandem with
climate and development aims. Unfortunately, the jurisprudence assessed to date does not lead to these outcomes for the
developing countries involved. Progressive interpretive approaches adopted by the DSM, and highlighted in section I
above, could be extended to domestic renewable energy policies
which advance nationally determined contributions under the
Paris Agreement and also protect public health and natural resources under both Articles XX(b) and XX(g).
A. STRATEGIC COMPLIANCE
The analysis shows that developing countries are already
using strategic compliance approaches to protect domestic development agendas and create more policy pace for themselves in a
trade-restrictive world. China was successful in defeating unilaterally imposed protectionist policies adopted by the US in relation to solar cells and wind turbines in principle, but substantive trade remedies to remove the trade-inconsistent behavior
have yet to be realized. Under WTO law, the case provided Chinese state-owned enterprises the flexibility to continue to provide subsidies to the industry provided the enterprises are structured so that they do not fall under the definition of a “public
body” under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. However,
China has not been successful in fact (as opposed to in law), as
the US has not brought its measures into conformance. In a corollary action, the US did bring a dispute against China for subsidies in the wind industry (China–Wind),328 and China decided
to remove the trade-distorting practice instead of pursuing the
dispute to a Panel decision.329 In relation to this consultation on
the China–Wind issue, even when China withdrew the offending
subsidies pursuant to the request for consultations from the US,
China’s pattern of strategic or “convenient compliance” allowed
it enough time to achieve economic dominance in the wind

327. WORLD BANK, supra note 136, at 6–7.
328. Consultation Requested, China–Measures Concerning Wind Power
Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS419/1 (Dec. 22, 2010).
329. Press Release, US Trade Representative, China Ends Wind Power
Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States in WTO Dispute, June 7,
2011, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2011/
june/china-ends-wind-power-equipment-subsidies-challenged.

2020]

RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRADE

65

industry, fulfilling its development goals through non-WTO compliant behavior, while maintaining its reputation as a responsible member of the international community by complying when
necessary.330
India may be pursuing a similar strategy. While its national
solar mission was found to be in violation of WTO agreements in
2016, the US raised a request in January 2018 for an Article 21.5
decision, claiming that two years after the AB decision, India
had not brought its program into compliance with WTO Agreements.331 India appears to be pursuing the same approach as the
US has in the US–Countervailing Duty case, and as China did in
China–Wind—by delaying compliance until developmental and
environmental goals have been largely achieved. Attempts by India to rely on international climate treaties and energy access
and energy poverty issues as an environmental or developmental defense under Articles XX(d) and (j) failed under WTO law.
India is strategically avoiding compliance in order to gain the
maximum environmental and developmental benefits of its national solar program.
There is also a notable absence of the mention of climate
mitigation in these disputes, apart from India’s emphasis on the
UNFCCC and Rio+20.332 The atmosphere would most likely form
part of natural resources protected under Article XX(g),333 even
if renewable energy is being exported outside of national borders. In addition, India’s National Solar Mission policy does not
focus on the health implications of climate change, and the role
that renewable energy can play in the reduction of pollution but
also the access to energy. Energy poverty can lead to disease,
gender inequality, and even death. As a result, diffusing renewable energy in rural areas could improve life expectancy, bringing the policy within the ambit of both Articles XX(b) and XX(g).
In the biofuels disputes, both Argentina and Indonesia were
successful in their anti-dumping disputes against the EU under
330. Oh, supra note 239, at 1141 (describing how China’s “pattern of convenient compliance allows Beijing not only to achieve its economic developmental
goals through measures that flout WTO rules, but also to improve its reputation
as a responsible member of the international community”).
331. Request for the Establishment of a Panel, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules–Recourse to article 21.5, WTO Doc.
WT/DS456/20 (Jan. 29, 2018).
332. But cf. Brazil–Taxation, supra note 91 (describing how taxation in the
automotive industry addressed climate mitigation goals).
333. See discussion, supra Part I.
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WTO law. This is in part due to the fact that export duties are
not disciplined by the WTO under these agreements, and this
has been a successful strategy in the disputes to date, in part. In
October 2017, the EU informed the WTO that it had adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1578 to fully implement the
AB’s decision regarding Argentinian soybeans.334 While Argentina welcomed this development, it also expressed its serious
concern with the European Biodiesel Board’s intention to petition the European Commission to initiate a subsidy investigation of Argentinian biofuel imports in order to avoid cheaper imports from Argentina and Indonesia due to the lowering of ADA
duties under (EU) 2017/1578.335 In relation to the second dispute, on March 1, 2018, the EU and Indonesia informed the
WTO that they had agreed to a reasonable period for the EU to
implement the Panel’s decision as 8 months, expiring on October
28 2018.336 However, in 2017, a decision was taken by the US
Department of Commerce to impose large anti-dumping duties
on biofuel imports from both Argentina and Indonesia, effectively protecting US biofuel producers.337 In 2016, Peru imposed
antidumping duties on Argentinian biofuels, and Argentina has
submitted a request for consultations with Peru.338 As a result,
disputes over biofuels are likely to continue.
With many developing countries containing the world’s largest stores of raw materials, they can be perceived as the new
“Renewable Superpowers.”339 These countries may even form an
334. Panel Report, European Union–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel
from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/Add.4 (Oct. 13, 2017).
335. See Meghan Sapp, European Biodiesel Board Preparing to Launch AntiSubsidy Case Against Argentina, BIOFUELS DIG. (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2017/09/28/european-biodiesel-boardpreparing-to-launch-anti-subsidy-case-against-argentina/ (discussing the desire of the EBB to launch an investigation).
336. Agreement, European Union–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel
from Indonesia, WTO Doc. WT/DS480/7 (Mar. 1, 2018).
337. Jim Lane, US Slaps Argentine, Indonesian Biodiesel Producers with
Huge Anti-Dumping Penalties, BIOFUELS DIG. (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2017/08/23/us-slaps-argentine-indonesian-biodieselproducers-with-huge-anti-dumping-penalties.
338. Request for Consultations by Argentina, Peru-Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures on Biodiesel for Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS572/1 (Dec. 5,
2018).
339. See Andrew Barron, Meet the New “Renewable Superpowers”: Nations
That Boss the Materials Used for Wind and Solar, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 19,
2018), https://theconversation.com/meet-the-new-renewable-superpowers-nations-that-boss-the-materials-used-for-wind-and-solar-91680 (discussing the
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“OPEC for Renewables,”340 signaling that global wrangling for
dominance in these new industries is likely to continue. The
largely negative outcomes for developing countries in energy disputes means that they are likely to continue to employ strategic
compliance approaches. Given the potential role of developing
countries in the global expansion of renewables, this may not be
all bad given the seeming inability of the DSM at the moment to
take into account the urgency of the climate crisis. This is due to
the WTO’s emphasis on reducing protectionism and stressing
non-discrimination in trade relationships—rules which to date
have largely benefited industrialized developed countries.
Existing trade disciplines under the WTO fail to take into
account development trajectories and energy access issues of developing countries, but also fail to cater for the climate mitigation impacts of domestic policies. Neither the WTO nor the DSM
was established to cater comprehensively for non-trade concerns, and policy space provided by Article XX was always anticipated to be strongly trade oriented. Through the multilateral
trading system, wealthy nations “have carved out a multilateral
order which best suits their own development trajectory.”341
OECD countries have used high-technology capacities and innovative technologies as the foundation of their national prosperity.342 Member states which are seeking to build an industry or
an export advantage will find scope to maneuver severely disciplined and conditioned by multilateral agreements such as the
SCM Agreement or TRIMS.343 Developing countries have

countries who will become the new “renewable superpowers” if and when demand for fossil fuel production resources switches to production elements for
renewables).
340. Id. (analyzing the implications of a hypothetical scenario where renewable resource rich countries form a coalition like OPEC).
341. Linda Weiss, Global Governance, National Strategies: How Industrialized States Make Room to Move Under the WTO, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 723,
724 (2005).
342. Id. at 730–31 (“The point being made is that the key instruments for
developing knowledge-based industries are not those targeted directly at the
development of productive capacity, but rather at the formation of high-tech
capabilities, and innovative technologies. It is the latter that OECD governments now view as the foundation for securing national prosperity and that the
WTO rules readily accommodate.”).
343. Id. at 726.

68

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 22:1

remained primarily exporters of natural resources.344 As a result, traditional trading patterns reflect the export of commodities and natural resources by developing countries, and the import of technology and services.345 By intertwining development
and environmental policies, developing countries are attempting
to scale the value chain, and avoid the “Dutch disease”; increased
revenues from natural resources can de-industrialize a nation’s
economy by raising the exchange rate and thereby make its manufacturing sector less competitive.346 This can trap developing
countries into a state of “underdevelopment” due to overreliance
on natural resource exports.347
Large developing countries such as China and India are attempting to break these traditional trade patterns by processing
raw materials and minerals before export,348 attempting a “collective correction by developing countries to their past development path.”349 Production taxes or quotas can be the first-best
policy instrument to address this, but risks what the WTO has
called “natural resource nationalism” and “beggar thy neighbour” trading asymmetries.350 Developing countries have attempted to address this issue through policies which combine
both environmental considerations as well as domestic protectionism.351 These policies have largely been declared

344. Bin Gu, Mineral Export Restraints and Sustainable Development – Are
Rare Earths Testing the WTO’s Loopholes?, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 765, 768–69
(2011).
345. Id.
346. WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2010: TRADE IN NATURAL
RESOURCES, 9 (2010).
347. Id. at 68.
348. GU, supra note 344, at 781.
349. Id.
350. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 346, at 5, 42.
351. The infant industry literature has mixed approaches to the success of
domestic protection policies. Some authors have stated that the infant industry
argument is well respected and legitimate temporary protection measure for
use in emerging sectors in developing countries in order to allow for a temporary
period of learning-by-doing. See Gene M. Grossman & Henrik Horn, Infant-Industry Protection Reconsidered: The Case of Informational Barriers to Entry,
103 Q. J. ECON. 767, 767 (1988); Takashi Negishi, Protection of the Infant Industry and Dynamic Internal Economies, ECON. REC. 56, 56 (1968); Bruce
Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiligtz, Helping Infant Economies Grow: Foundations
of Trade Policies for Developing Countries, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 141, 146 (2006).
But see Kevin Rask, Evidence of the Empirical Relevance of the Infant Industry
Argument for the Protection of Brazilian Ethanol Production, 10 AGRIC. ECON.
245, 246 (1994) (finding no empirical evidence that infant-industry protections
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incompatible with WTO rules through energy disputes. In the
trade context, failures by developing countries in energy disputes are not surprising where the disputes revolve around
green industrial policies.
As these disputes move into their trade remedy phases, it
seems that developing countries are choosing to retain their
green industrial policies and adopt strategic or convenient compliance approaches to WTO rulings, or looking for WTO loopholes or inconsistencies,352 particularly where they do not feel
their domestic goals under the policies have been achieved. This
has been demonstrated in the China–Wind and India–Solar disputes.353 Prompt compliance results only when developmental
aims have been achieved, as illustrated in the China–Wind consultations. The lack of involvement of small- or medium-sized
developing countries as either complainant or respondent in
these disputes confirms this trend. These countries tend not to
be as active in the DSM, and even if they were, it is only large
developing countries that can afford to engage in strategic compliance strategies.
Developed countries appear to be adopting similar protectionist approaches, particularly in the US–Countervailing Duties and biofuels disputes, caving to pressure from their own domestic industries.354 Under the biofuels disputes, developing
countries are therefore being denied access to markets even
when their domestic policies are WTO-compliant.355 There is not
much that can be done about this behavior except to pursue
trade remedies at the international level or attempt to resolve
the issue through diplomacy. It appears, then, that where countries can afford to withstand the imposition of trade remedies,

helped the Brazilian biofuel industry); Arvind Panagariya, A Re-examination of
the Infant Industry Argument for Protection, 5 J. APPLIED ECON. RES. 7, 13
(2011) (arguing that, even with this approach, later market entrants still enjoy
competitive advantages); Robert E. Baldwin, The Case Against Infant-Industry
Tariff Protection, 77 J. POL. ECON. 295, 295 (1969) (arguing that the approach
would not induce domestic firms to invest in innovation); Nisar Ahmed, Competitive Strength of Nations: Doing Business in a Global Market, 1 EURASIAN J.
BUS. MGMT. 41, 43 (2013) (arguing that infant industry protection hampers domestic firms’ future growth).
352. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 461.
353. See supra Part IV.A.3.
354. See supra Part IV.A.2.
355. Id.
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they will choose to retain trade-inconsistent clean energy policies—at least until they have achieved domestic aims.
In the short term, a strategic compliance approach may be
beneficial for the climate if developing countries use this policy
space to increase the domestic manufacture and diffusion of renewable energy technology that has climate benefits. It is widely
acknowledged that China’s domestic industrial approach to
clean energy technology such as solar and wind has been responsible for the reduction in price of these technologies globally,
leading to price parity with fossil fuels.356 This development can
only be positive for global climate stabilization goals. However,
China is a unique player due to its scale and size, and not all
protectionist policies are good for the climate. For example, the
climate benefits of biofuels have been hotly contested. Protectionist biofuels measures adopted by developed countries—
where domestic policies of developing countries are WTO-compliant but climate-unfriendly—may also be beneficial.
In the long term, however, more synergy between the trade
and climate regimes should be found. Trade remedies in response to multilateral disputes can include tariff increases and
other trade-restrictive measures in order to counter the alleged
injury caused by a subsidy. Other parties could take unilateral
action as well in the face of a stasis at the DSM.357 Recent protectionist policies by the US through import tariffs are anticipated to increase the price of solar panels.358 It is estimated that
between 2008–2012, trade remedies affected US $32 billion
worth of trade in green products.359 Unilaterally imposed antidumping or countervailing duties to counter domestic subsidies
356. INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 27, at 28–40 (noting
that China “is the biggest location for renewable energy investment” and leads
in innovation); Charlie Campbell, China Is Bankrolling Green Energy Projects
Around the World, TIME (Nov. 1, 2019), https://time.com/5714267/china-greenenergy/; Dominic Chiu, The East Is Green: China’s Global Leadership in Renewable Energy, 13 CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L. STUD. 3, 6 (2017).
357. For example, § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 in the United States has
been effectively used to impose trade sanctions on other countries. Lynne Puckett & William Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement under Section 301:
At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 675, 681 (1996) (noting that many
sanctions under § 301 have led to successful settlements of the underlying issue).
358. Oliver Milman, Donald Trump’s Tariffs on Panels Will Cost US Solar
Industry Thousands of Jobs, GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/23/donald-trump-tariffs-solar-panels.
359. Meléndez-Ortiz & Sugathan, supra note 198, at 113.
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lead to more expensive products and import barriers,360 and so a
stable and fair trading system in renewable energy which has
demonstrated climate benefits is needed in the longer term. In
the longer term, synergy between the WTO and the goals of the
Paris Agreement would lead to a more cohesive and mutually
supportive global trade and climate strategy.
VI. FUTURE STRATEGIES: A TWO-STEP
JURISPRUDENTIAL ADVANCE
As the climate crisis increases, global imperatives such as
climate mitigation may either regulate how WTO norms are applied or in some cases even displace those norms.361 This movement has yet to occur based on the current set of energy disputes
analyzed. While the DSM did incorporate customary international law in some disputes, it did so narrowly, and almost discounted the importance of the UNFCCC regime in its interpretive approaches.362 Alternative approaches are available and set
out below. In the longer term, it will be important for the WTO
to both engage in legislative reform and adopt climate-compatible approaches to Article XX. While legislative reform such as
adding a no-action category of subsidies under the SCM Agreement, or political decisions through a climate waiver would be a
much more comprehensive approach, they may be politically unfeasible to achieve in the short term. Given the required urgent
emissions mitigation, and the need for dramatically scaled up
action in the next decade, a twofold jurisprudential approach is
suggested below as a partial solution.
A. STEP ONE: RELYING ON AND REINTERPRETING ARTICLE XX
Energy and trade are two separate regimes, and a future
framework agreement on energy at the WTO would provide far
more legal coherence in this area.363 Given the current lackluster
progress of the Doha Development Round, a new trade

360. The use of countervailing and antidumping duties is widespread, even
though subsidized imported products would be cheaper for consumers within
those nations. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 281; see also supra, Part II.
361. Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, Renewable Energy Disputes in the
World Trade Organization, 13 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.J., 3, 11 (2015).
362. See supra Part V.A (discussing disputes where the DSM found
measures in violation of trade rules despite their potential importance to climate change).
363. Cottier et al., supra note 189, at 3.
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agreement is unlikely to be agreed anytime soon. A number of
authors have suggested a “climate waiver” or the re-introduction
of non-actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement, and the
successful conclusion of the EGA negotiations.364 Member states
can adopt an authoritative interpretation of provisions of the
WTO Agreements, for example, in a declaration that measures
taken pursuant to the Paris Agreement would fall within the
scope of Article XX, or negotiate a “peace clause” providing a
cooling off period before challenging national climate
measures.365 Farah and Gima suggest the incorporation of a sunset clause or period of transition to allow developing countries to
achieve a level of development in clean energy fields.366 These
strategies would all provide a more comprehensive approach to
trade and climate change and may be successful if global priority
and attention is focused on reinvigorating the WTO. However,
given the current stasis of legislative reform at the WTO, it may
take some time to reach political agreement. In the interim, a
jurisprudential approach may be an appropriate stop-gap and
raise the profile of climate change as both an important and legitimate policy objective of the WTO.367
Reliance on Article XX by developing countries has been
wholly unsuccessful in these energy disputes since 2010, and not
all defenses available under Article XX were used by these countries.368 In addition, DSM interpretations of these provisions
have excluded issues of sovereignty, health, or development, and
narrowed interpretations of Article XX. Public health concerns
under Article XX(b), which are traditionally afforded a large
dose of respect by the DSM, were unsuccessful in these disputes.
364. See BACCHUS, supra note 122, at 10; Meléndez-Ortiz & Sugathan, supra
note 198; Joachim Monkelbaan, Using Trade for Achieving the SDGs: The Example of the Environmental Goods Agreement, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 575, 598–99
(2017).
365. Droege et al., supra note 13, at 36–37.
366. Paolo Davide Farah & Elena Gima, WTO and Renewable Energy: Lessons from the Case Law, 49 J. WORLD TRADE 1103, 1116 (2015).
367. Dent argues that re-evaluation of international norms of state intervention in the realm of clean energy trade should be a priority for the WTO,
given its global implications. Supra note 12, at 740. Doelle argues that the climate mitigation impacts of clean energy policies should be given priority by the
WTO, given the global implications of climate change. See Meinhard Doelle,
Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Motivate State Action on Climate Change Through the WTO, 13 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENV’T L. 85
(2004).
368. See supra Part V.
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Regulatory autonomy for the transition to renewable energy under Article XX(d) was disregarded given the lack of specificity
and bindingness in both international and domestic law. Green
industrial policy was too protectionist to be favored under Article
XX(g), which was confined to environmental conservation
only.369 Finally, the DSM was not amenable to energy access and
energy poverty arguments under Article XX(j).370 A number of
approaches are suggested below which could be adopted by developing countries under these subcategories to overcome these
obstacles.
1. Article XX(b)
It is possible that connecting local content requirements or
other protectionist measures to overall policy objectives of reducing cost and increasing (local) dissemination of renewable energy, combined with the economic and poverty eradication imperatives and air quality crises in many developing countries,
could be persuasive in the interpretation of Article XX(b). Empirical evidence connecting the economic elements of a domestic
policy to increased manufacturing and dissemination of renewable energy technology would have to be put forward, and combat
any other economic arguments such as that simply importing
cheap renewable energy technology may achieve the same domestic policy objectives.
Public health concerns were not raised by either India or
China in the context of climate change in these disputes. This is
surprising as both of these countries are struggling with high
pollution levels primarily due to the burning of fossil fuels.371
The transition to clean energy could be cited in domestic policy
documents as contributing to the resolution of mounting public
health concerns, particularly air pollution, with the requisite
data and empirical connections to both health concerns and
369. See supra Part IV.
370. Id.
371. However, in the China–Rare Earths dispute, China did attempt to use
public health concerns regarding pollution levels in the mining of rare earth,
but this argument was given short shrift by the Panel under Article XX(b), perhaps due to the concern by the Panel of lack of domestic action to conserve rare
earth minerals. China’s domestic minerals policy was not specific enough regarding the link between export restraints and conservation and reduction of
pollution. However, it is curious that domestic production cuts were not sufficiently linked by the Panel to Article XX(b). See China–Rare Earths, supra note
110, at ¶ 5.116.
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reduced emissions provided. Rich jurisprudence in both the Brazil–Retreaded Tyres and EC-Asbestos372 disputes provides countries with large policy discretion when it comes to public health
priorities, provided comprehensive domestic objectives are
clearly articulated and carefully linked to justify any trade-restrictive elements. This avenue could provide more policy space
to developing countries in the context of climate change if specific links are made to domestic health concerns. These health
issues could also be linked to energy access and energy poverty
issues, providing a multi-layered approach to justify increasing
the diffusion of renewable energy.
The applicability of Article XX(b) requires a reference to how
measures are linked to environmental or public health objectives, and general references to these objectives are unlikely to
be successful without more detailed domestic policies on emissions and pollution reduction, as well as data linking fossil fuel
use to air pollution and associated respiratory diseases.373 If
countries do this, limited room to maneuver could be opened up
through the employment of public health considerations due to
climate change and air pollution. Given historic policy space provided to countries in the realm of public health, if argued robustly Article XX(b) may provide some relief—provided the tests
in the chapeau can be cleared.374
2. Articles XX(d) and XX(j)
These energy disputes also provide legal interpretations of
a number of provisions under both Article XX(d) and XX(j). In
the India–Solar dispute, the DSM demonstrated limited concern
for energy access and energy sustainability considerations under
these provisions.375 Arguments regarding energy poverty and/or
climate change in the context of Article XX(j) were not considered. Energy access arguments were considered, but only briefly
by the Panel. Arguably energy poverty issues are folded into energy access, but the Panel provided scant attention to this argument and the need for access to clean energy for development
purposes. Instead, the Panel focused on trade concerns, unable
372. See supra Part II.
373. Ruth Jebe, Don Mayer & Yong-Shik Lee, China’s Export Restrictions of
Raw Materials and Rare Earths: A New Balance Between Free Trade and Environmental Protection?, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 579, 617 (2013).
374. See supra Part II.
375. See supra Part V.A.3.
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to find a link between reduced domestic production of renewable
energy and reduced imports. As such, the Panel concluded that
India’s green industrial policy was as much about boosting domestic industry as it was about filling growing domestic energy
demand.
In that dispute, the DSM was not willing to consider international climate change agreements as qualifying under Article
XX(d) without a specific degree of bindingness of renewable energy provisions. Hortatory, domestic policy-based language was
clearly not sufficient to qualify under Article XX(d). This requirement of “hard normativity” by the DSM ignores the soft law elements of the climate change governance regime, including the
Paris Agreement, and its emphasis on nationally determined
contributions and progression of national ambition on climate
change mitigation targets over time. Accelerated action under
the Paris Agreement is likely to trigger more trade law challenges to domestic policy making without sufficient recourse to
Article XX.376 In this regard, developing countries should consider tighter, legally binding language in national policies or climate legislation, with closer and more explicit links to climate
change and their nationally determined contributions regarding
clean energy transitions, with discretion provided to cater for energy poverty issues in order to provide stronger normativity, targets, and action at the domestic level. Article XX(d) may also
provide some assistance if developing countries are willing to
tighten the language of domestic policy directives and legislation, linking clean energy policies more directly to public health,
domestic environmental concerns, and nationally determined
contributions under the Paris Agreement.
3. Article XX(g)
As the interpretation of the XX(g) disputes illustrates, it is
likely that the atmosphere would qualify as an exhaustible natural resource under Article XX(g), and a climate policy aimed at
conservation of a human, plant or animal species would also
qualify under Article XX(g).377 Therefore, this exception could
376. BODANSKY ET. AL., supra note 45, at 348.
377. Id., at 333 (arguing that in light of past panel decisions, the “global climate itself” could qualify as an exhaustible natural resource); see also Appellate
Body Report, US–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted May 20, 1996) (affording policies to reduce
the depletion of clean air protection under GATT XX(g)).
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provide developing countries with considerable policy space to
implement green industrial policies, provided they have empirically demonstrable climate benefits. There may be some obstacles to this approach, though, which would require strict mitigation of emissions domestically to meet the even-handedness
requirement as set forth by the DSM. This corollary domestic
activity could be activity which is articulated in a country’s nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement,378
which is designed to be updated in five-year cycles, demonstrating progressive domestic reduction of greenhouse gases. Implementation of progressive nationally determined contributions
domestically could demonstrate that any renewable energy policy is designed to work in tandem to achieve domestic emissions
reductions, fulfilling the “even-handedness” approach.
Domestic measures and policies were scrutinized by the
DSM to determine whether they met the even-handedness requirement under Article XX(g).379 While parity between foreign
and domestic measures may not be necessary, some activity on
the domestic front towards conservation will be necessary to
qualify for Article XX(g). This could be achieved through closer
integration between, say, the establishment of production quotas and export duties and the direct application of export duties
or license fees to environmental conservation and remediation.
The DSM has narrowly confined the application of Article XX(g)
to conservation-only measures. As currently interpreted, the development of green industrial policies which seek a broader development scope beyond conservation are unlikely to be palatable to the DSM without this being raised at the appellate body
level in the future, and more deference provided to well designed, climate-friendly domestic policies. Green industrial policies with domestic economic elements and an export focus are
unlikely to succeed, given recent jurisprudence under Article
XX(g), unless stringent domestic measures are also undertaken.
This approach could align with the Article XX(d) strategy suggested above, with progressive domestic emissions reductions
combined with strict environmental procedures implemented domestically. Linking environmental export tariffs directly to fund
environmental remediation and clean energy policies may also
illicit more positive consideration by the DSM.

378. Paris Agreement, supra note 4.
379. See supra Part I.C.
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B. STEP TWO: DSM RE-INTERPRETING ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS
WITH A CLIMATE LENS
The recommendations outlined above all have sweeping domestic costs and regulatory implications for developing countries, and movement cannot only be one way on this issue. The
DSM should reconsider the applicability of Article XX in the context of climate change. This may require a re-interpretation of
its application, in particular the chapeau, in the context of countries’ legitimate efforts to implement domestic climate policies.
This will be important to retain the legitimacy of the WTO generally, and in particular in playing a role to address the climate
crisis. Whether these countries demonstrate an appetite to cater
their domestic landscapes more closely to trade compliance, or
simply continue with strategic or non-compliant behavior to
achieve their green industrial policy goals, remains to be seen.
The outcome of energy disputes to date indicates strategic noncompliance is the more likely outcome, unless more progressive
interpretation of Article XX is undertaken at the DSM.
1. Article XX Chapeau
Despite the suggested strategies, even if a measure succeeds
under a sub-provision of Article XX, it must still prevail under
the chapeau test, which contains strict guidance on trade distorting elements of a measure.380 These recent energy disputes
demonstrate that no matter the environmental objective or effect, as long as a policy violates a trade obligation, the environmental policy will likely encounter some issues under the chapeau.381
Given the DSM’s preference for multilateralism when interpreting the requirements of the chapeau, it is possible that the
multilateral arrangements, including nationally determined
contributions under the Paris Agreement,382 may be considered
by the DSM as legitimate policy making on climate change. Negotiation of the Paris Agreement took many years (arguably decades), and its provisions, although largely soft law, should qualify as “serious, good faith efforts” to reach an understanding on

380. See supra Part I.D.
381. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 405–06.
382. Paris Agreement, supra note 4.
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multilateral approaches to combat climate change.383 In addition, parties are subject to stringent transparency requirements
regarding the development and submission of their nationally
determined contributions under the Paris Agreement,384 which
should provide the degree of transparency emphasized by the
Appellate Body when interpreting the chapeau. Provided domestic energy policies fall in line with a country’s nationally determined contribution (which are to be updated in five-year cycles),
multinational negotiations which agreed to and periodically reviewed these contributions should be sufficient to pass the test
of the chapeau. However, while some progressive interpretation
of the chapeau has come before,385 and robust arguments could
be put forward about the multilateral negotiations under the
Paris Agreement meeting the procedural elements of the chapeau, any trade distorting element of a renewable energy policy
may struggle to survive the chapeau.
Policy space for developing countries to scale the value chain
in clean energy is therefore not likely to be tolerated by the DSM
with current interpretive approaches to Article XX. This is not a
real difficulty for the environment as the trade distorting elements of these policies can be separated from the environmental
aspects.386 However, this approach may cause difficulties for
some developing countries, depending on their fiscal situations,
and developing countries may want to use protectionist
measures to grow and expand their industries. This may particularly be the case with export duties which can provide direct
383. Cf. US–Shrimp Art. 21.5, supra note 117, at ⁋153 (upholding a previously invalidated trade measure as the responsible party was involved in “serious good faith negotiations” with the other parties involved); Mehling et al. supra note 92, at 468–69 (noting, however, in relation to the element of the
chapeau which prohibits a measure from discriminating against countries
where the same conditions apply, that comparing different climate policies is
vexing, and that given the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities under the Paris Agreement and special and differential treatment under the WTO, special considerations should be applied to
Least Developed Countries, although these latitudes are not likely to be given
to emerging economies, the subject of this paper).
384. See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, art. 13 (describing the transparency
framework).
385. See US–Shrimp Art. 21.5, supra note 117, at ¶¶ 140–148 (affirming the
argument that practices and procedures which are “comparable in effectiveness” meet the “essentially the same” standard).
386. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 407 (noting instead that the real
danger to green policies lies with increasing unilateral trade measures at the
domestic level).
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financial benefits, including increasing the financial capacity of
the government for environmental remediation.387 Fiscal constraints in developing countries may lead them to dump costly
environmental policies without domestic protection mechanisms
and direct development gains.388 Increased domestic development of clean technologies in a country the size of China can
have international positive spillover effects through climate mitigation, which strict environmental policies divorced from development gains could undermine.389
Climate change mitigation considerations barely figured in
these energy disputes, and climate change itself was not mentioned at all by the DSM, illustrating its focus only on trade distorting measures.390 This indicates that alternative interpretations of the chapeau of Article XX would also have to be adopted
by the DSM, taking into account the urgency of climate change.
Some general principles and interpretive approaches could be
adopted by the DSM. In the first instance, climate change could
be considered by the DSM as a legitimate policy imperative,
which in some circumstances could balance or negate any trade
distorting measure. A more balanced approach giving equal consideration to both the climate protection effects of measures and
trade discrimination could be adopted by the DSM. As articulated in Part I above, the DSM regularly adopts weighing and
balancing tests when assessing the appropriateness of domestic
policies in the context of trade rules and discriminatory treatment. Secondly, where a domestic policy has overwhelming climate benefits which significantly outweigh any discriminatory
treatment (even through export), the DSM should allow it. This
may require more comprehensive analysis on the impacts of
measures both in terms of climate benefits (arguably more difficult to assess in the export context) and trade distortive impacts.
In order to do this, a different interpretive approach to the
chapeau of Article XX needs to be adopted which harkens back
to older and more progressive interpretations adopted by the

387. Id. at 426–428 (explaining that China’s export duties incentivize local
industry to exploit recourses, which in turn expands a tax base that could theoretically be used for environmental remediation).
388. Id. at 462 (“Those facing tighter fiscal constraints would be more inclined to jettison costly environmental programs without offsetting economic
gains.”).
389. Id.
390. See e.g. India–Solar, supra note 259; supra Part IV.A.3.
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DSM in environmental disputes.391 Trade distortive measures,
provided they are closely connected to legitimate climate policy
objectives, should be assessed for their climate-legitimacy and
allowed where there are clear, demonstrated climate benefits. In
this balancing test, the DSM would provide deference to legitimate climate policy making which has demonstrated health and
environmental effects. In order to do this, more climate and energy experts need to be appointed on to the Panels and Appellate
Bodies. The DSM has a history of progressive interpretive approaches to Article XX, giving due deference to coherent and
comprehensive domestic policies in the areas of public health
and natural resource conservation.392 This interpretive approach
should be applied to domestic climate and energy policies, particularly when they are clearly and cogently applied, and empirically proven to support public health, resource conservation,
and climate aims.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This decade will be a critical one for the efficacy of the multilateral trading system, at least in the short term, as well as for
the Paris Agreement.393 If the WTO is undermined due to stasis
at the appellate body level, it is likely that countries will revert
to strategic compliance and protectionist measures, as well as
rely on bilateral or regional trade agreements where they exist.
If the WTO is revived in the future, its approach to climate
change should be significantly revamped. In moments of disruption and crisis there is opportunity for significant change and
transitional relief.394 There is no doubt that we are now facing a

391. See Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 405 (discussing the “‘[c]lassic’
trade and environmental disputes” Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle).
392. See US–Shrimp, supra note 74, at ¶ 141 (arguing a regulation on
shrimp imports should be interpreted in light of its environmental purpose of
protecting sea turtles); US–Gasoline, supra note 85, at ¶¶ 6.21, 6.37 (interpreting Article XX(b) broadly to include a rule intended to reduce gasoline emissions
and classifying clean air as an exhaustible natural resource for Article XX(b)’s
purposes).
393. The second round of nationally determined contributions are due in
2020 and should demonstrate increased ambition on emissions reductions.
394. See Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV.
ENV’T. L. REV. 91, 94 (2011) (stating that in response to disruption, policy makers can choose between providing and withholding transitional relief for regulated entities).
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climate crisis, and the relationship between the WTO and the
Paris Agreement needs to be significantly revised.
Given the current inability of developing countries to rely on
Article XX in energy disputes, their policy options are limited. In
the short term, strategic compliance and the decline of multilateralism could benefit emerging economies if they use this policy
space to increase the manufacture and diffusion of renewable
energy through policies which are well designed, properly implemented, and have significant climate benefits. In the area of biofuels, protectionist measures by developed countries are detrimental to emerging economies, but may not be to the climate
where biofuel policies do not have climate benefits.
In the longer term, if the WTO revives as the main trading
arena, renewable energy disputes at the DSM are likely to escalate. Developing countries should tighten their domestic policies
and rely on Article XX exceptions more effectively. The approach
of the DSM and its interpretation of Article XX should also be
revised. The WTO itself needs to have a stronger voice in areas
of major global concern, including climate change.395 A stronger
role of developing countries within the WTO is also key to its
success.396 Adopting a more climate- and sustainable development-friendly interpretation of Article XX provisions could
achieve this dual goal and result in a strengthened WTO system
which is better adapted to the sustainable development aims of
many of its member states, as well as a progressive (instead of a
regressive) position on the critical issue of climate change.
“[T]rade can provide a catalyst for bringing together regulators,
civil society, business, and energy industries to help shape domestic decarbonization policies that meet climate mitigation
goals . . . .”397 Developing countries are already an important laboratory for public policy and green growth, and existing strategies show great potential for simultaneous inclusive green
growth and environmental protection.398 Where these initiatives

395. KLASEN, supra note 47, at 82 (arguing that the WTO needs “to increase
its participation in areas of crucial concern, for example on climate change”).
396. Id. at 80.
397. Elizabeth Trujillo, International Trade, in LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 197, 215 (Michael B. Gerrard & John
C. Dernbach eds., 2019).
398. Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 253 (concluding that developing
countries in the global south are “a global laboratory for public policy” and
“green growth efforts”).
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have clear climate benefits, they should be fostered and encouraged by the WTO.

